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Rousseau and His State:
A Review of the Politics and Rhetoric of The Second Discourse
by Russell Arben Fox
The writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau can be powerful and moving in their criticisms of
modem society. His insight is still disturbing to us today in that it forces us to rethink our
notions of society, government, and freedom. Yet examined closely, his Second Discourse
contains important contradictions about human possibilities and human freedom. In the end,
accepting his conclusions might require that we indulgingly overlook these contradictions.
But perhaps the power of his ideas is precisely in his passionate, romantic, and even
contradictory rhetoric.

If we follow the progress of inequality in these various revolutions, we shall find that the
establishment of laws and of the right of property was its first term, the institution of the
magistracy the second, and the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power the third and the
last; so that the condition of rich and poor was authorized by the first period; that of the
powerful and weak by the second; and only by the third that of master and slave, which is
the last degree of inequality, and the term at which all the rest remain, when they have got
so far, till the government is either entirely dissolved by new revolutions or brought back
again to legitimacy.
(Rousseau 33:32-39; hereafter, references to Rousseau's Second Discourse will be by page
and line number only)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau has always been a
fascinating figure, for his lifestyle as well
as his ideas. But while his lifestyle (which
apparently consisted of a good many romantic walks around the countryside of
France and Switzerland) is perhaps unique
amongst Enlightenment thinkers, the reception of his ofttimes radical and occasionally brilliant ideas by modernity has
been unique as well. Allan Bloom, author
of the profoundly conservative The Closing
of the American Mind has nonetheless
dedicated a good portion of his career to
Rousseau, and admits that, upon reading
his work, "one feels that (Rousseau) presented the human problem in its variety
with greater depth and breadth than any of
his successors" (Bloom 1987, 579). Robert C. Solomon labeled Rousseau a "socio-

path," while simultaneously pointing out
that he inspired "some of the most spectacular and successful philosophy that the
world has ever known" (Solomon 1988,
2). (Will Durant, the eminent historian,
suffers from none of these contradictory
feelings, and simply calls Rousseau
"queer"--Durant 1933, 187.)
What did Rousseau do? In a nutshell,
Rousseau presented a radical rethinking of
what it meant to be human, to be rational,
and to be free. His version of the Enlightenment did not celebrate the powers of
reason to cure human injustices, but rather
the expressive ability of the human self to
transcend the complexities and (numerous)
injustices which inevitably arose from the
very application of "reason." Unlike most
that came before him, Rousseau denied
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that society and government (particularly
the government of his day) was a sign of
the progressing human condition. Nor did
Rousseau accept the idea of an Enlightened
government as the guarantor of basic
rights ever-threatened by humankind's
"baser nature." His claim that human
beings are truly free--free to be ethical, to
choose between good and evil--prior to the
development of civilization or reason
raised a challenge to modernity reflected in
the work of Kant (who desired to make
Rousseau's "self' rational, and thus preserve both reason and passion, science and
religion) as well as much of the political
tradition that followed.
Rousseau's first substantial work is
titled A Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind, commonly referred to as The Second Discourse. In the Discourse (written as an
entry in an essay contest which asked
"Have the Sciences Improved or Depressed the State of Man?") Rousseau
challenges the "states of nature" presupposed in the writings of empiricist thinkers
like Hobbes and Locke, claiming that their
analysis of the development of the human
animal simply sustained and justified politics as it then existed. On the one hand,
Hobbes saw human nature as vile, with a
strict material dominion over man by a
ruler being the only plausible political
alternative; on the other, Locke saw humankind as possessing natural rights and
inherent characteristics which government
must ratify and adhere to. But both of
these writers, argues Rousseau, made
human beings political even in their primitive, natural, "original" state, thus justifying rational, political answers to the human problem. Rousseau claims to take
another route, to another state of nature,
one that shows humans as peaceful animals, eventually robbed of their natural
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freedom by "civilized" government. On
this model, Rousseau builds his case
against government and the state.
Unfortunately, Rousseau's state of
nature--and the very way he argues for it-is problematic, and sometimes outrageous.
Is he trying to tell us that "returning" to
the state of nature as he describes it is the
only solution to oppressive government?
That is how many understood his work,
originally: Voltaire viciously satirized the
Discourse as "a book opposed to the human species" (Durant 1933, 188). However, Rousseau concludes his essay by
claiming such a return to nature is impossible (41:32-36). He even precludes the
possibility of returning to the state of
nature he describes by declaring (inconsistently with what follows) that his primitive
state isn't really a "real" one (3:2)--except,
of course, in terms of his argument.
So the best question, when approaching
Rousseau and the influence he has had on
modem political thought (an influence
which began with The Second Discourse),
is perhaps one of rhetoric: what is
Rousseau's argument, and how well does
it stand up? I believe that an examination
of the essay will reveal numerous difficult
contradictions and assertions in its reasoning, but that such problems do not undermine the work as a whole. Rousseau, ever
the romantic, was far more interested in
rhetorically prompting a rethinking of the
role of government than in building a
sound argument against a historical interpretation that assumed freedom required
politics. By firmly associating government
and rational society with that which is
debilitating, unequal, immoral and wicked,
Rousseau hoped to bring about a crisis of
faith in regards to existing institutions.
Hence, the importance of this paper's
introductory quotation, in which Rousseau
(perhaps illogically) places the blame for
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all evil and inequality at the feet of government . . . or at least, points to government as the manifestation of that which led
humankind to discard liberty for the sake
of "laws," "property," and "rulers," all of
which unfortunately have come to appear
as necessary, and all of which Rousseau
paints in uncompromisingly ugly terms.
Rousseau's essay is broken up into four
parts. First his Preface, in which he lists
the sorts of inequalities that exist amongst
mankind, and how other attempts to assess
the human condition (and thus, the source
of these inequalities) "have inquired into
the foundations of society ... but not one of
them have got there" (2:30); following
that, there are the First and Second Parts,
which describe man in his primitive natural state, and follow through those circumstances which have "made man wicked
while making him sociable" (19:30-31).
In his Appendix, he sums up his argument
by stating that while men are "actually
wicked," they are (or were) "naturally
good" (37:47-48), and concludes by anticipating that many will read into his essay a
call to "totally abolish" society; a call
which he says one cannot follow, though
he does not entirely dismiss it (41:16-18).
Exactly how Rousseau manages to (or fails
to) make all these points coherent must be
examined. l
A Critique of Rousseau's Second

Discourse
Preface and The First Part
Rousseau's first goal is to establish the
importance of his argument. In describing
the characteristics of mankind, he lists
inequalities which should be apparent to
all, one of which he calls "natural, or
physical" and the other "moral or political" (2:8-10). Not "legal," not "civil," but
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"moral." Rousseau is consciously framing
the debate in a very fundamental, very
passionate way. Legal or civil inequities
may be addressed dispassionately, but by
placing the "privileges which some men
enjoy to the prejudice of others" (2: 12) in
the moral realm (something never considered by Hobbes and other supporters of
the rulers' "divine" right to rule over--and
in that way, serve--his subjects), Rousseau
engages the emotions, in a overtly serious
manner. This is what he wants. By using
moral imperatives, he allows himself
maximum room to delve deep into an
obviously hypothetical past, and root out
the source of government itself.
What follows is an immediate deconstruction of mankind. Rousseau's human
is spoken of in terms one would usually
associate with animals: "natural fertility,"
"instinct," and so forth. Man was, Rousseau claims, as far as animals go, "weaker
than some, and less agile than others; but,
taking him all around, the most advantageously organized of any" (4:5-6). Such
men are secure in their simplicity, afraid
of storms and pleased by fresh water. In
nature they are not weak, as Rousseau
believed his fellows were, since the "effeminate way of life totally enervates ...
strength and courage" (6:41-42).
And yet, Rousseau is apparently not
entirely comfortable with all this ... nature.
His frequent references to the Greeks
(Plato, Machon, Hippocrates, Xenocrates,
etc.) begin immediately and continue
throughout the text. This reveals more
than Rousseau's familiarity with the classics; his reliance on them in constructing
his argument reveals his sympathy for the
ancient virtues the classics teach. Criticizing the "modern communities" which
create servile characters, Rousseau looks
fondly towards the example of ancient
Sparta, comparing that city with nature in
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her treatment of her citizens: "those who
come well-formed into the world she
renders strong and robust, and all the rest
she destroys," instead of "making children
a burden to their parents, kiU[ing] them
indiscriminately before they are born"
(4:26-30).
Sparta, incidently, is the only government or state, ancient or modem, to receive a good word from Rousseau. Two
good words, in fact. Later in the essay,
when Rousseau gives a description of yet
another of early governments' failings--due
to mistakes in policy and organization it is
"continually being patched up," which was
made difficult because of the government's
unfinished previous policies--he states that
"the first task should have been to get the
site (for a society) cleared and all the old
materials removed, as was done by
Lycurgus at Sparta" (29:24-26). Rousseau
did not necessarily see the ancient Greek
polis as an answer to the human problem,
but he drew much inspiration from it, and
was profoundly influenced by the Greek
emphasis on, not comfort or material gain,
but certain natural virtues, in his choice of
what he would later call "the most stable
of epochs" (24: 10).
First, however, Rousseau must construct as pleasing a state of nature as possible, so as to make more pitiful the fall
man suffered when he left this state, and
thus to have a stronger argument against
existing governments. It is here where we
encounter the foremost of the essay's
contradictions: his creation of mankind as
a passionate, yet passionless, animal.
Rousseau wants to claim that primitive
man was absolutely not a political creature, so as to not allow for making freedom or rights in any way dependent upon
government or rulers. Doing such was a
materialism common in Enlightenment
thought: freedom and political rights were
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considered to be, if not outright created
by, than at least made real and available
solely through Enlightened politics. Rousseau himself believed that individual power
originated in the natural, ethical, human
self, and that government and society have
nothing to do with it. (Rousseau elsewhere would argue that the power of free
action is constituted by the "general will,"
which is only found in freely entered into
communities; however, he maintains that
these potentialities originate in human
being itself, sans politics.) People who
engage in Hobbesian reasoning, Rousseau
believed, were imposing concepts that
originated with civilization upon primitive
creatures who lacked any such ideas (see
2:34; 14:20; 18:49).
Of course, in order to escape the same
charge of investing his state of nature with
"civilized concepts" (whether liberal or
otherwise), Rousseau needed to describe a
state of nature that is without passions. As
he writes, "nothing could be more unhappy than [a] savage man, dazzled by science, tormented by his passions, and
reasoning about a state different from his
own" (13:41-43). Thus, he necessarily
must place humankind in a state of independent simplicity, instead of in a state
where man is obligated by (made dependent upon--see 14:25-36) his self-interested
(read: political) emotions. Unfortunately,
such a wild animal would appear to be
completely outside the realm of human
existence; in order for his argument to
make any sense to his readers, Rousseau
must show how these simple human animals became like he is--a modem, wretched, government-ruled creature. A bridge
must be built between the past and the
present for his story of man (hypothetical
or not) to be anything more than sciencefiction. In building this bridge, however,
Rousseau does subject his primitive hu-
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mans to passions--two, in fact. They are
compassion and self-perfectibility.
Consider the second first. In what
sense is the essay's much-discussed "faculty of self-improvement" (8:8) a passion?
Originally it does not appear to be one; it
is simply a developmental capacity which
man has to a degree which brutes do not.
But later in the essay Rousseau describes
this characteristic in terms of an emotional
state, a driving force behind human action.
And what is the origination of this driving
action?
Difficulties soon presented themselves, and it became
necessary to learn how to surmount them: the height
of the trees ... the competition of other animals ...
all obliged him to apply himself to bodily exercises
... Natural weapons, stones, sticks, were easily
found: he learned to surmount the obstacles of nature,
to contend in case of necessity with other animals ..
. or to indemnify himself for what he was forced to
give up to a stronger [man]. (20:30-41)

In the Discourse Rousseau defines selfpreservation (which, in the face of the
natural competition that Rousseau describes in the preceding quote, often means
"improvement") as "man's first feeling"
(20:22). Surely Rousseau is describing an
element of character that is more than
simply physical; feeling implies emotion,
or passion. Rousseau's humans are passionately self-perfectible.
The same may be said for compassion,
only more so. Consider the language of
the essay:
... What is generosity, clemency, or humanity but
compassion applied to the weak, to the guilty, or to
mankind in general? Even benevolence and friendship are, if we judge rightly, only the effects of
compassion, constantly set upon a particular object:
for how is it different to wish that another person
may not suffer pain and uneasiness and to wish him
happy? Were it even true that pity is no more than a
feeling, which puts us in the place of the sufferer ... this truth would have no other consequence than
to confirm my argument. Compassion must, in fact,
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be the stronger, the more the animal beholding any
kind of distress identifies himself with the animal that
suffers. (15:35-44)

All sorts of virtues are connected by
Rousseau with this one passion: generosity, benevolence, friendship, clemency, etc.
This one "natural virtue" (14:49) may be
good and praiseworthy; however, it, like
the previously mentioned passion for selfimprovement, only compromises
Rousseau's position. A human being who
feels compassion for his fellow beings will
inevitably want to aid them in a more proactive sense--he will gather the wounded
together after an avalanche, he will make
sure no one falls behind during a relocation to another cave, a mother will feed
her young (something that Rousseau, in
one his more tremendously bizarre assertions, claims is originally done only to
relieve discomfort: "a mother [gives] suck
to her children at first for her own sake;
and [only] afterwards, when habit had
made them dear, for theirs"--1O:43-45).
The problems these passions pose for
Rousseau's humans are, at least at this
point, primarily stylistic: to what extent
can Rousseau effectively create a non-political, state of nature Paradise when he
gives his creatures the sorts of passions
that have naturally pushed mankind towards the sorts of cooperative problemsolving which is plainly the source of civilization--and government? By allowing for
any passion to exist in primitive man,
much less two, he allows for the contention that his state of nature wasn't such a
happy place after all. Imagine a man
struggling to resolve his inability to keep
himself warm, feed his children, light his
way, build a bridge, or kill a wooly mammoth--and remember Rousseau's statement
about men being "tormented by his passions" (13:43). Obviously then, if humans
are in fact the way Rousseau describes
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them, the advancement of civilization in
some ways did lessen humankind's misery.
And civilization, for all intents and purposes, means government (or at least,
Rousseau never argues that you can have
one without the other).
How to resolve this? Rousseau doesn't, insisting that the passions he has given
primitive man are simply part of his makeup, and in spite of them mankind remains
in a state of happiness. The term used in
describe these passions by Rousseau is the
neutral "possibilities." But that definition
only opens up a line of thought with even
greater problems, which are best considered in connection with the essay's Second
Part and the question of freedom.
While all this bad logic does not obviate the validity of Rousseau's argument
against the depressing assertions about
mankind made by Hobbes, it does make
his work of conjecture that much more
inconsistent. It emphasizes some of
Rousseau's more absurd contentions,
including the radical anthropomorphism he
engages in while describing animals, and
makes more obvious the condescending
admiration he has for "primitives"--African natives who can see as far as the
Dutch can with telescopes, American
natives that can trace Spaniards by their
smell as well as any dog, and those "savages" who can "drink the strongest European liquors like water" (7:22-28).
Rousseau, in crafting The Second
Discourse, attempts to make a distinction
between the natural man and the natural
equality and happiness which he apparently
believes existed in mankind's primitive
state, and the inequality and unhappiness
which inundated the civilization all around
him, all for the purpose of attacking existing institutions in favor of creating others.
Unfortunately, in order to accomplish both
required ends (i.e., to demonstrate the

Pi Sigma Alpha Review

6

peace and happiness of the natural state,
and to show how the natural state degenerated into the modem one, thus constructing
an argument that is more than simply
fantastic and irrelevant), he had to create a
man who moved from one state to the
other, and that required a man that was
free from painful, stressful passion, but
who had some passions for civilization as
well.
Despite these flaws, Rousseau's construction of history is persuasive, at least
in a romantic sense. It does seem, allowing for all possible qualifications, that
mankind was in a happier state when there
was no government. What remains now is
to examine how Rousseau uses language to
demonstrate that the establishment of
government as it was known in his time
prevents any return to that state, and
whether or not mankind is, in actuality,
free to make such a choice.
The Second Part and Appendix
The Second Part of The Second Discourse is much different in tone than the
first: it is rapid, moving mankind in a
downward spiral towards government and
all its ills. It engages in far fewer leaps of
logic than the first, for presumably, if the
reader can accepts the assertions of the
First Part, if only hypothetically, then the
tragic story of mankind's Fall is only
logical. Rousseau's story, however, also
includes a subtle yet bothersome contradiction, one that threatens to undo far more
than simply the author's condemnation of
Enlightenment society.
Rousseau begins mankind's descent
towards government by supposing that
various difficulties (the same difficulties
made bearable thanks to mankind's passion
for self-perfectibility) encountered in the
act of preserving one's own existence
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would eventually force primitive man to
recognize the existence of others of his
own kind--in fact, recognize, become
familiar with, and eventually discern conformities and distinctions between them
(21: 17-27). In other words, like deer,
men and women would bump into each
other, and develop a primitive sense of
how to relate. In time, Rousseau claims,
humans will naturally gather themselves
together, though Rousseau believed that at
first they were perhaps less than adept at
joint operations:
If a deer was to be taken, everyone saw that, in
order to succeed, he must abide faithfully by his post:
but if a hare happened to come within the reach of
any of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it
without scruple, and, having seized his prey, cared
very little, if by so doing he caused his companions to
miss theirs. (21:41-45)

It was this "first revolution" (22: 11)

that initiated a change of monumental proportions. Men, who before this point had
existed in pure simplicity, began to build
houses (well, huts) and to live in close
proximity to each other (22:5-12), presumably so that it wouldn't be difficult to
round up a bunch of the fellows for a
hunt. While Rousseau does employ some
surprising language to dramatize this shift,
it is at first not at all negative: "these first
advances," "first expansions," "this novel
situation" (21:5, 20). He writes that human beings living in proximity "soon gave
rise to the finest feelings known to humanity, conjugal love and affection. Every
family became a little society, the more
united because liberty and reciprocal attachment were the only bonds of its union"
(21:22-24). Certainly, this hardly seems
to be a harbinger of damnation--in fact, it
seems a positive step.
The problem with communities, however, is that they give rise to leisure time,
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which gives rise to a desire to fulfill superfluous wants (22:32-36). Given differences in environment and climate, certain
communities of men will emphasize certain
things, and these distinctions will give rise
to the ideas of "difference" and "comparison" (23: 11)--of course, comparisons of a
sort were already taking place, but these
earlier distinctions were benign. Even
these later distinctions, however, were not
yet fulfilling Rousseau's bloody prophecy
of intimacy leading to "human blood [being] sacrificed to the gentlest of passions"
(23: 17), for he qualifies himself at this
point by saying that this "just mean between the indolence of the primitive state
and the petulant activity or our egoism,
must have been the happiest and most
stable of epochs" (24:9-11). There are·
two reasons why this is so.
First and foremost, primitive society
was fundamental to the introduction of
morality (24: 1). While Rousseau's language may seem to play up the sanctity of
a passionless state, without morals or
virtues, he is actually very interested in
virtue, a virtue which can be best established by a certain moral sense. (Remember his respect for the Greeks.) This need
for morality is most obvious by looking at
Rousseau's essay in reverse: his every
criticism of government involves the corruption and decay of respect and decency,
the degeneration of manners and honesty
(see, for instance, 26: 19, 34-39; 27:43-47;
31:38; 33:23-31; and many, many more).
These virtues, Rousseau claims, are not
present in primitive man, who is just as
likely to strike out at a physical affront as
to forget it, who is simple, pleasant,
peaceful, but not suitably passionate (forgetting here that he has already given men
passions). It is only after the "first revolution" that we see the appearance of "industrious[ness]" (22:6), which seems to be in
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Rousseau's eyes a fulfillment of personal
worth. These virtues are, of course, to be
found through society (not through govemment--they are found in spite of that institution, Rousseau insists), which has, in at
least a minimal way, the approbation of
the Divine Creator. (This is a sample of
Rousseau's later writings about the importance of community, if not society.)
Mentioning God brings us to a second
reason why Rousseau believed this strange
primitive society was the "happiest" of all
possible epochs--it is in accordance with
the law of nature, which, to a wandering
(literally and theologically) theist like
Rousseau, is the same as being in accordance with the law of God. Throughout
the essay, Rousseau employs the term "law
of nature" as a tool, much as he does
"natural liberty. " The laws of nature and
God are the same; in honoring the laws of
nature we are honoring the purpose of our
creation (see 3:7; 28:31; 41:33). It is this
sort of virtue and nobility which is shown
in the actions of the man of primitive
society; it is also the sort of nobility that
Rousseau apparently saw as present within
certain ancient societies (like Sparta) that
did not deny the difficult path to virtue
proscribed by nature (4:26).
Rousseau argues that since most tribal
people "have been found [already] in this
state . . . men were meant to remain in it,
that it is the real youth of the world"
(24: 15-16). So basic is this idea of basic,
natural, "primitive" virtue to our very
reason for existence that Rousseau describes the world as so created that this
state could not be departed from, except
through unfortunate accident (24: 11-13).
Of course, apparently such accidents
did in fact take place, for we are no longer
utopianly primitive, nor living in a primitive Utopia. How does Rousseau explain
this?
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With the development of society, simple communication, Rousseau claims, gave
way to complex intercourse, prompted by
the distinctions and affections which men
feel. While this does not in tum lead to
evil, it does lead to trade and commerce,
and to the development of economy.
Rousseau characterizes this development in
terms of "iron and com" (24:36). The
growth of metallurgy and agriculture in
tum prompts specialization and separation,
and ultimately competition. After this,
exploitation. This meant that the natural
distinctions which remained intact in primitive states become tools for gratifying
wants at other's expense.
In this state of affairs, equality might have been
sustained, had the talents of the individuals been
equal, and had, for example, the use of iron and the
consumption of commodities always exactly balanced
each other; but, as there was nothing to preserve this
balance, it was soon disturbed; the strongest did the
most work; the most skillful turned his labor to best
account; the most ingenious devised methods of
diminishing his labor; the husbandman wanted more
iron, or the smith more corn, and, while both labored
equally, the one gained a great deal by his work,
while the other could barely support himself. Thus
natural inequality unfolds itself insensibly with that of
combination, and the difference between men,
developed by their different circumstances, becomes
more sensible and permanent in its effects, and begins
to have an influence, in the same proportion, over the
lot of individuals. (25:47-26:5)

The end result of all this, of course,
was "avarice, ambition and vice" (27:8),
the results of the frustration mankind felt
when confronted with claims which are
patently against the laws of nature. As
Rousseau wrote, "however speciously they
[the rich] might disguise their usurpations,
they knew that they were founded on false
and precarious titles" (27:24). Man,
within his primitive, virtuous society,
would naturally have challenged any unnatural accumulation of wealth, for it
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would be taking place without the "express
and universal consent of mankind," and in
the face of poverty and starvation to boot
(27:32). And indeed, unless the situation
brought by the specialization of economy
was institutionalized, man would certainly
have eventually overthrown the exploiters.
This is why government, the bastion of the
wealthy, the self-aggrandizing class, was
created: so as to legitimize existing inequities, and to perpetuate them.
With this point, Rousseau's Discourse
reaches its climax; everything after this is
addendum. And having read this far, one
cannot escape the feeling that Rousseau
has made mankind's corruption an inevitability. Certainly saying so makes the
human predicament all the more pitiful;
and yet, in view of his rhetoric, one must
wonder: what hath Rousseau wrought?
His human beings have moved from a state
of passionless (yet oddly passionate) existence to a more conventional state, and
from then on to civilized government and
all its ills. Why? The question is an
important one ... Rousseau wants to argue
for the true freedom of mankind, for the
idea that political possibilities do not exist
because of government and society but
rather exist within the community-based
context of government and society, prior to
its actual formation. But if humans moved
without real choice towards such an
end ... what does it all matter, anyway?
The freedom that Rousseau gave mankind was laid out early in his essay:
Nature lays her commands on every animal, and the
brute obeys her voice. Man receives the same impulsion, but at the same time knows himself at liberty to
acquiesce or resist: and it is particularly in his consciousness of this liberty that the spirituality of his
soul is displayed. (7:50-8: 1)

However, if mankind was truly free,
fundamentally, wouldn't those passions of
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self-improvement and sympathy for one's
fellow had urged mankind away from this
dreadful path? Why is it that, as soon as
government was proposed as a solution to
primitive man's ills:
All ran headlong to their chains, in hopes of securing
their liberty; for they had just wit enough to perceive
the advantages of political institutions, without
experience enough to enable them to foresee the
dangers. The most capable of foreseeing the dangers
were the very persons who expected to benefit by
them; and even the most prudent judged it not inexpedient to sacrifice one part of their freedom to ensure
the rest; as a wounded man has his arm cut off to
save the rest of the body. (28:6-12)

It seems that men were unable to return to their former state, or at least slow
down the approach of that which would
destroy their paradisiacal existence forever. And yet...if they were unable to avoid
it , how is it that mankind is free? In the
face of Rousseau's outrageous explanations
accounting for the development of language (revolutions of the globe and earthquakes tore off land masses and made
islands, forcing frightened groups of humans to hurriedly develop means of communicating with those they were stranded
with) and metallurgy (volcanoes spout
molten lava and pieces of melted rock,
sparking the idea that fire, if hot enough,
can be made to do the same thing), it
seems that humans truly were instinctual
animals, without the ability to withstand
the changes life forced upon them (22:4550; 24:49-50).
One might claim that Rousseau meant
that these and other amazing situations
forced the development of humans accidently--that what he called mankind's
"possibilities" (still insisting they are not
passions) were merely activated in a certain way by the situation, but that things
needn't have resulted the way he described
them in his essay. However, if this is so,
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and human beings might not have developed towards modem society as a result of
global accidents, then we can only assume
one of two things: First, primitive man's
reactions could have been entirely accidental, in which case his passions aren't really
passions at all--aren't even true possihilities--but simply random actions. This
completely throws Rousseau's argument in
jeopardy, preventing as it does any connection with the plight of modem man and
hence any salient argument against the
governments of the day or Hobbes's theories. If man was this way, and then,
through happenstance (there was a flood,
man did this, and look what came of it)
developed into a wonderful primitive
society and from there into a terrible
modem one, why shouldn't we have the
governments we do now? There is no
reasonable historical standard or ethical
principle against which to critique them.
The other possibility is that men might
not have become modem, but didn't become so accidently--when faced with
difficult situations, they made unwise
choices, and in that way we arrived in our
present state. This does preserve man's
freedom of will, as well as the salience of
Rousseau's attack on those with negative
views of man and his governmental needs.
However, such an assumption necessarily
means Rousseau's Discourse is a call to
return to a state of nature. If man in fact
made his present state (through the operation of their non-passion passions), then
obviously, if what Rousseau says about a
more primitive state is correct (or even
partially so), we ought to re-make ourselves and society in that direction.
Claiming that man is free and has chosen
his path but now, because of the power of
government, is limited in his ability to
escape, simply contradicts Rousseau's very
eminent desire to make menfree. And
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yet, if man is free, then Rousseau's Discourse would apparently want us to revolt
against the cities, and flee.
This is a difficult, yet intriguing position. Rousseau concludes his essay saying, as has been pointed out, that returning
to a state of nature is impossible . . . for
him and "men like me" (41:26). (Another
question: If anti-social romantics like
Rousseau can't get "back to nature," then
who could?) However, as was plainly
mentioned in the introductory quotation, he
does not dismiss the possibility of "new
revolutions" (33:39). Where could such
revolutions take man except back to nature? In which case, Rousseau's argument
is, in fact, as aggressively anti-intellectual,
anti-social and anti-science as it has been
so frequently characterized. What use is
Rousseau to us then? Obviously, society
is not about to disappear, and his claims
that things were at their very best when
mankind was back in huts would require a
major renovation in thought, one that
would dismiss the importance of life-saving and crop-growing technologies in favor
of the freedom to go naked. A possibility,
perhaps, but a difficult project just the
same. Does he want humankind to take
said project on? If not, is it because we
aren't free? Is our passionless primitive
state forever lost to us? If so, then why
should we believe we are free? And if we
are free, is it because our passions enable
us to act for ourselves? If that's so, then
maybe we wouldn't want to go back,
because civilization and government help
soothe our passions. Don't they? In the
final analysis, Rousseau hints at many
things, but comes clear on very little.
Perhaps he himself hadn't thought it
through entirely.
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Conclusion
Rousseau has remained, over the centuries, a vital and disturbing thinker because
his thought, like The Second Discourse
itself, is filled with romantically imagined
contradictions, which simultaneously reveal and undermine numerous insightful
observations on the Enlightenment and the
human condition. His language--his reasoning--is poetic, passionate, perplexing
and often extremely nonspecific (the word
"government" only appears 14 times in the
whole Discourse). However, especially
when one is discussing that which is actually introduced as a hypothetical, that may
be the very best language to use. Does
Rousseau's rhetoric hold water? It does,

but only if one is willing to overlook
several strange assumptions, and bear with
a contradictory conclusion in regards to
freedom. The question as to what JeanJacques Rousseau really wanted to accomplish when he sat down to write this essay
will probably remain unresolvable: while it
is a emotionally powerful indictment of the
materialistic, scientific, political world
which he saw dragging men down, it is
also inconclusive as to whether or not man
can actually escape that dragging, or
would want to. Both Rousseau's state and
his state of nature remain out of the reach
of both reason and passion. But, if nothing else, The Second Discourse remains
one hell of an example of reaching.
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1.

In The Second Discourse, Rousseau nearly always uses the masculine in describing
humankind. In order to avoid continual grammatical correction, I will (under protest)
generally follow the pattern of his essay.)

"ff Men Were Angels":
The Normative Role of Schools in Fostering Civic Virtue

by
William M. Bryner
The April 1992 riots in Los Angeles, California reemphasized a decline in the American
social environment and highlighted the need for new methods by which to remedy this
degradation. For a solution to this problem, this paper looks to the Founding Fathers'
conception of civic virtue, the voluntary moderation of one's self-interest for the good of the
community. Further, a functional rethinking of the role of public schools is set forth in
which schools playa key role in fostering civic virtue. Finally, a moderate reform of
constitutional adjudication is proposed which would enable public schools to more adequately
accomplish this task.

I. Introduction

The title of this essay conveys a special
and perhaps ironic significance in modem
American society. The phrase, first employed by James Madison (writing under
the pen name Publius) in Federalist, Number 51 ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary" [Hamilton, Jay,
and Madison 1987, 281])1 inspires two key
observations. First, simply put, men are
not angels, as the very existence of government testifies. Second, because of this,
one of the necessary functions of government is to guard against man's imperfections. Angels presumably require no
supreme authority to ensure adherence to
law; they are entirely self-governing.
Error-prone humans, on the other hand, do
require just such an authority.
The tragic 1992 riots in Los Angeles
have added a fresh meaning to Madison's
words. Perhaps no other event in recent
years has verified Madison's statement
more than the spirit of anarchy which
overtook and ruled that city before government could restore order. Nowhere were
man's "less-than-angelic" qualities more

evident than in the city whose name literally means "The Angels. "
The Los Angeles incident raises the
question: What can be done to prevent
such a situation from recurring? This
essay will attempt to answer this question
by constructing a theoretical framework
within which many of the ills of the sociopolitical environment would be abated. As
the subtitle indicates, the essay will look to
the normative power of schools as an
instrument to nourish the civic virtue upon
which American political institutions rest.
This thesis--that schools can and must
playa key role in fostering civic virtue if
the social condition is to improve--provides the essay's basic structure. Part II
will attempt to define civic virtue and
emphasize its primacy in the American
Founding. Part III will then analyze the
special potential of schools, assess their
unique position which makes them key
actors in encouraging virtue, and suggest
some specific measures which ought to be
considered to enable schools to reach their
normative potential. Part IV will offer
some general conclusions arising from this
discussion.
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One important caution must be offered
before commencing. This essay does not
advocate an approach that fits perfectly
within the current conception of the American political structure. Instead, it deemphasizes the positive (what is) and focuses
primarily upon the normative (what ought
to be). If the events in Los Angeles teach
nothing else, they unequivocally indicate
that change of some sort is not simply a
good idea, but a political necessity. Thus,
this approach requires a rethinking of
certain positions as well as some accommodations by several parties; yet the price
to pay is a minimal one if the nation is
serious about improving its social environment.

ll. Civic Virtue and the American
Founding
The term "founding" captures the
essence of our nation's beginnings. "To
found" means principally "to lay the base
of' something (Guralnik and Friend 1968).
In the political sense, the American
Founding refers to the way in which the
"Founding Fathers" (men such as James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin
Franklin, and others) "laid the base of' the
American form of government, particularly
the Constitution. Yet, a "founding" implies a "foundation," or a set of basic
principles upon which the superstructure
rests. As Professor Martin Diamond has
indicated:
... foundation must be understood quite literally:
American institutions rest upon it. Those who wish
to improve American life ... must base such improvement upon the American foundation; and this
means to come to terms with the "policy" that is an
essential part of that foundation. (1986, 95)

This section of the essay will explore
civic virtue as a foundational concept for
American society. Indeed, virtue was "a

Bryner--The Normative Role of Schools
theme that was paramount at the time of
the American Founding but . . . has since
receded from public discourse" (Pangle
1987, 105). It represents the very principle whose absence the Founders believed
would doom the American republic to
government by "accident and force" instead of by "reflection and choice" (1.2).
A. From Aristotle to America: Civic
Virtue Defined
In order to grasp the core of civic
virtue in America, one must return to
Aristotle's concept of what constitutes
virtue. Aristotle argued that "moral virtue
... is a mean between two vices, one
involving excess and the other deficiency"
(1963, 41). Thus, the excesses or deficiencies of attributes were considered vices
and opposed to one another; but the mean
between the two poles opposed both ends
and defined virtue. For example, the
classic virtue of courage rested at the mean
between the vices of cowardice (a deficiency) and recklessness (an excess). In
Aristotle's view, "a master of any art or
craft shuns excess and defect, but seeks
the intermediate and chooses it" (34).
Virtue can therefore be viewed as a continuum, and the closer to the midpoint an
individual is, the more virtuous that individual will be.
Admittedly, Aristotle and the American
Founders differed on many issues, particularly the role of virtue in the polis. For
instance, Aristotle saw virtue as the ultimate end for which government existed; to
the contrary, the Founders viewed it as a
useful means toward good government
(Pangle 1987, 110). Nevertheless, the
Aristotelian concept of virtue as the midpoint between two poles will be an invaluable component and a recurring theme
throughout the remainder of this essay.
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Throughout The Federalist, Publius
echoes this same sentiment under the title
of "moderation." In fact, moderation, or
the willingness to compromise and move
toward the "middle," provides the latent
framework of this commentary on the
Constitution. In Number One, Publius
contends that:
... we, upon many occasions, see wise and good
men on the wrong as well as the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of
moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded
of their being in the right in any controversy. (1.7;
emphasis added)

Later, we find him lamenting "that public
measures are rarely investigated with that
spirit of moderation which is essential to a
just estimate of their real tendency to
advance or obstruct the public good"
(37.2; emphasis added). Finally, he asserts that the "judicious reflections" of The
Federalist in themselves "contain a lesson
of moderation" (85.18; emphasis added) to
those who read them. For example, that
Madison and Hamilton, who disagreed
greatly on the nature and extent of national
power, could set aside their differences to
corroborate in writing The Federalist is
just such a lesson of moderation.
Aristotle's concept of virtue as a mean
and Publius' extolment of moderation are
particularly useful in understanding the
metamorphosis of ancient virtue to modern
American virtue. Richard Vetterli and
Gary Bryner, in their comprehensive study
of virtue and the American Founding,
contend that American civic virtue is
essentially a synthesis of the classical
virtues (courage, moderation, justice, and
wisdom) and the Pauline virtues (faith,
hope, charity, and benevolence). Thus,
while "[classical] civic virtue ... meant
the patriotic subordination of one's person-
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al interests to the common welfare" (1987,
20) and the Judeo-Christian virtues dictated that "[people] were to be motivated by
a sincere interest and love for others"
(1987, 4), what they call "a modem republican virtue" (1987, 4; emphasis added)
rested somewhere between the two.
American civic virtue, then, can be
seen as the Aristotelian mean between the
classical and Pauline poles of virtue, and
contains three key components. First,
virtuous citizens must, when necessary,
temper their individual self-interest when it
threatens the public order. Second, virtuous citizens must practice something akin
to the biblical Golden Rule, being motivated by a benevolent concern for others
(Vetterli and Bryner 1987, 50). Finally,
"their ... self-interest [must] be voluntarily channeled and constrained" (4;
emphasis added); government should not
take an active role in compelling citizens
to be virtuous. In a certain sense, American civic virtue is nothing more than the
practical application of Publius' "moderation. "
B. "How Firm a Foundation?": The Need

for Civic Virtue in a Republic
This concept of civic virtue--restriction
of individual self-interest when it threatens
public order, benevolence toward others,
and a voluntary undertaking of these-provides the essential groundwork upon
which American institutions rest. In framing the American system of government,
the Founders necessarily assumed that
these characteristics existed in sufficient
measure to provide a firm foundation for
the repUblic. Simply put, they believed
that republican government presupposed a
moderately virtuous people.
Publius preceded his aforementioned
statement concerning men, angels, and
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government with a significant rhetorical
question which ultimately guided the
Founding: "But what is government itself,
but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature?" (5l.6). If government mirrors
the natural characteristics of its citizenry,
then to attempt to found a government that
is inconsistent with human nature is an
exercise in futility. Thus, the Founders'
first step was to evaluate the nature of
man.
In this assessment of man, the Founders again took the moderate course, adopting a realistic view of man's potential.
Individually, man was "ambitious, vindictive, ... rapacious" (6.2), possessed an
"ordinary depravity" (57.16), and often
allowed "the clamors of an impatient
avidity for immediate and immoderate
gain" to suppress "the mild voice of reason" (42.11). In collective bodies, men
were not much better. They would often
engage in "improprieties and excesses, for
which they would blush in a private capacity" (15.15) and would often sacrifice "the
great interests of society . . . to the vanity,
to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of
individuals" (70.12). Clearly, men were
not angels; if they were, "no government
would be necessary" (5l.6).
Publius' grim realism concerning the
nature of man must, however, be tempered
in order for free government to succeed.
Indeed, readers of The Federalist are
counseled "to view human nature as it is,
without either flattering its virtues or
exaggerating its vices" (76.11). While it
is true that "there is a degree of depravity
in mankind which requires a certain degree
of circumspection and distrust," it is also
true that "there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion
of esteem and confidence" (55.15). Thus,
the Founders held a moderate view of
human psychology, seeing man as an
amalgam of both "good" and "evil."
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Such a view of humanity acted as an
important catalyst for the structure of
government which emerged from Philadelphia. Publius saw "[a] dependence on the
people" as "the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary [meaning secondary and supporting] precautions"
(5l.7; emphasis added) to protect against
man's shortcomings. Moreover, while it
was "evident that no other form [than a
republican government] would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of
America [its character and nature]" (39.2),
it was also true that "[republican] government presupposes the existence of these
[virtuous] qualities in a higher degree than
any other form" (55.15). Ultimately, selfgovernment "[implied], that there is a
portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence" (76.11; emphasis
added).
Two salient points emerge from this
discussion. First, the institutional arrangements embodied in the American Constitution require a moderately virtuous citizenry. The Founders were emphatic in stressing this necessity. Publius argued that if
"there is not sufficient virtue among men
for self-government," then, "nothing less
than the chains of despotism can restrain
them from destroying and devouring one
another" (55.15). Later, Madison asked in
the Virginia State Ratifying Convention:
Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are
in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks, no
form of government, can render us secure. To
suppose that any form of government will secure
liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people
is a chimerical idea. (McClellan 1989, 280)

Other Founders also supported this position (Vettedi and Bryner 1987, 69-71).
Second, while not glorifying man, the
Founders evidently believed that the Amer-
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icans of 1787 possessed sufficient civic
virtue to make republican government
work. Were Americans without government as naturally corrupt as Hobbes saw
them, then only a despotic sovereign of the
Hobbesian order would be able to control
them (Hobbes 1968). Conversely, "[it]
men were angels, no government would be
necessary" (51.6). Instead, the Founders
based American institutions upon a moderately virtuous citizenry. Without a sufficient degree of civic virtue, the republican
structure would ultimately crumble.
At this point, the principal question
which remains to be answered is how civic
virtue can be perpetuated from generation
to generation. In opposing the Constitution, the Anti-Federalists argued that civic
virtue would actually be undermined in the
extended, commercial republic that the
Constitution established. Instead, they
contended that only an "intimate government" (McDowell 1987, 127) "over a
relatively small territory with a homogeneous population" (Storing 1981, 15)
would be conducive to virtue. The national government would simply be too distant
to foster effectively the virtuous citizens
who would voluntarily restrain their selfinterest for the good of the republic.
The supporters of the Constitution
were in qualified agreement. The extended national government was a political
necessity to check the evil nature of man,
to control the effects of factions (see The
Federalist, Number 10), and to allow
"[ambition] ... to counteract ambition"
(51.6). However, virtue would instead be
fostered by "primary institutions" (Vetterli
and Bryner 1987, 52) or "private associations" (Brown 1987, 39) at the state and
local level. In fact, if "the state [assumed]
the primary directive role" in inculcating
virtue "through indoctrination and propaganda, . . . it [would] be unable to count

upon the genuine spontaneous response of
its people over time," and would be
obliged "to resort to a high level of administrative direction of society and greater
degrees of force and coercion" (Vetterli
and Bryner 1987, 53) if public order was
to continue. Thus, while the national
government was a negative political necessity, local institutions were to playa positive role in fostering the requisite virtue in
the citizenry.
This discussion's impact on the current
sociopolitical environment should be clear:
this foundational aspect of American republicanism has changed little since 1787.
A sufficient degree of civic virtue--the
voluntary moderation of individual selfinterest for the good of others and of
society--is still a prerequisite to political
success. Events of the last few decades,
with the Los Angeles incident being only
the most recent, have heightened the need
to reemphasize the importance of civic
virtue and develop ways to generate it.
How might this discussion help to
prevent another situation similar to Los
Angeles? In examining the riots, it was
evident that the most damage was done by
completely self-interested individuals who
felt no need (nor desire) to moderate their
passions for the sake of public order. In
short, such an episode would never have
occurred among citizens possessing a
moderate degree of civic virtue. Civic
virtue, then, represents the fundamental
control against such destructive behavior.

m.

Schools as Promoters of Civic
Virtue

Whether they are known as "primary
institutions" (Vetterli and Bryner 1987,
52), "private associations" (Brown 1987,
39), or some other title, families, schools,
churches, neighborhoods, and other local
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structures carry the principal responsibility
for fostering civic virtue. Because of their
direct contact with citizens in their formative years, schools in particular can play a
unique role in transgenerationally nourishing virtue. Unfortunately, the teaching in
public schools of those values which constitute civic virtue has recently fallen into
disrepute (Bauer 1986, 24-27; Cannon
1981, 3-7; Hafen 1987, 677-695; Janowitz
1983, ix-xiv; Wildavsky 1991, 46-54).
This section will seek to accomplish
three objectives: (1) to examine objections
to teaching the values inherent in civic
virtue, (2) to submit a functional rethinking of the school's role in American government, and (3) to propose some recommendations that will allow schools to more
fully reach their normative potential. This
reevaluation and its subsequent solutions
will be founded upon the principle of
moderation outlined in Part II.

cannot be verified by empirical testing
(Bauer 1986, 24; Bohn 1990).
Underlying all objections, however, is
the belief that teaching values is somehow
inimical to the First Amendment, particularly the guarantee of freedom of speech
and the protection against the establishment of religion. Efforts at moral education, critics contend, inhibit students' free
expression (Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser 1986), simply reflect tenets of
the Judeo-Christian ethic (Bauer 1986, 2425; Wildavsky 1991, 47), or both. Invariably, opponents of moral education focus
upon individual constitutional rights (a
topic which will be taken up in Part
III.C.). By doing so, they almost automatically look to the courts for a remedy.

A. Objections to Moral Education

Any legal opposition to moral education that is rooted in individual rights must
inevitably focus upon constitutional language, namely, "Congress shall make no
law ... " (Amendment I; emphasis added); and " ... nor shall any State . .. "
deny any person due process of law or
equal protection of the laws (Amendment
XIV, Section 1; emphasis added). Within
this framework, the Supreme Court has
recognized an "essential dichotomy" between public and private acts (Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks 1978, 165). Currently, the
public-private dichotomy is an all or nothing proposition: if state action is involved,
the courts balance the individual rights and
government interests involved and render a
decision; if the act is private, there is no
constitutional limitation and the individual
has no recourse (Worthen 1991, 1306).
While determining what exactly constitutes
state action can be difficult--for example,
actions by a private restaurant leasing its

American civic virtue is, by its nature
and definition, value-laden. While teaching the mechanics of American government is a necessary component of nourishing civic virtue, independently it is not a
sufficient aspect. Indeed, "the action of
one person toward another" is "the central
concern of morality" (Heslep 1989, 15).
Thus, inculcating civic virtue inherently
involves a type of values (or moral) education.
Opponents of moral education object to
it on several grounds. Many commonly
respond, "'Whose morals are you going to
teach?'" (Etzioni 1991, 9); others contend
that certain values (Le., sexual restraint,
abstention from drug use, and others) are
not as "valuable" as traditionally believed
(Bauer 1986, 24); and some argue that
values are intrinsically subjective and

B. Rethinking the Public-Private
Dichotomy: Schools as Mediating
Institutions
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building from a state agency (Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority 1974) and
court enforcement of a private property
agreement which discriminates based upon
race (Shelley v. Kraemer 1948) are both
considered state action; acts of a utility
company operating under a state-granted
monopoly (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co. 1974) are not--the Court has consistently held that actions by public schools
are considered state action (West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943;
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 1969; Everson v.
Board of Education 1947; and many others) and that public school teachers perform a government function (Ambach v.
Nonvick 1979).
By employing this formal framework,
the Court is forced to emphasize the dichotomous poles and somehow to draw a
line between public, government institutions and private ones. Within this structure, government institutions--including
public schools--cannot (and should not)
impose value systems upon their members
because, as mentioned earlier, to do so
would preclude a voluntary reaction of the
citizens and would necessitate a greater
degree of government coercion to obtain
the desired response (Vetterli and Bryner
1987, 53). Therefore, within the publicprivate dichotomy, such actions are appropriately left entirely to the "private" realm.
The difficulty, however, is that the
Court has concurrently recognized the
special importance of education as "the
very foundation of good citizenship"
(Brown v. Board of Education 1954, 493).
Moreover, "a State properly may regard
all teachers as having an obligation to
promote civic virtues and understanding in
their classes" (Ambach v. Nonvick 1979,
80; emphasis added). Within the polar
pUblic-private framework, it seems contra-
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dictory to see public schools as promoters
of civic virtue (a "private" function) and
as a "function of state and local governments" (an obviously "public" task)
(Brown v. Board of Education 1954, 493).
Though referring specifically to the
normative power of cities and Indian
tribes, Brigham Young University law
professor Kevin J Worthen2 has proposed a
resolution to this conflict by advocating a
Figure 1. Normative Role of Various American
Institutions.
Organization
I.

The Family

2.

Private Voluntary
Organizations (social
clubs, churches, etc.)

3.

Public Schools

4.

Nonconstitutional
Governmenta (cities,
Indian tribes, etc.)

5.

Federal Government

Normative Role
High

Moderate

Low

perspective akin to the Aristotelian mean.
He argues:
The extent to which modern American organizations
are morally justified in imposing norms on their
members can be plotted on a continuum. More
voluntary organizations, such as purely social clubs,
are at one extreme of the continuum, and the federal
government is at the other. States are close to the
federal government extreme of the continuum, but do
not reach it because one can more easily switch states
than countries. Local governments, while closer to
the states than social clubs, nonetheless fall more to
the voluntary side of the continuum than do state
governments. Thus, some group value decisions are
more appropriate for local governments than for
either the federal or state governments. (1991, 1286)
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As "public intermediary institutions"
(Worthen 1991, 1290), standing between
the individual and the state, local governments can playa role in giving "meaningful voice to disparate value systems"
(Worthen 1991, 1312) and fostering civic
virtue.
Bruce Hafen, former dean of the
Brigham Young University School of Law,
points out that public schools, like local
governments, possess the unique ability to
act as "mediating institutions." Hafen
argues that, traditionally, "schools have
been, at times quite literally, in loco parentis: in the place of the parents" (1987,
673). As an extension of the family,
schools were called upon to reinforce the
values fostered in the home. Indeed, "the
traditional commitment of the schools to
teach children such civic and moral virtues
as integrity, cooperation, self-reliance, and
responsibility remains central to the task of
public education" (700).
Nevertheless, Hafen asserts that since
Brown v. Board of Education "called upon
the public schools to assume the role of
direct state agents in the desegregation of
society" (674), schools have moved "even
further from the localized world of home
and family toward the nationalized world
of federal policy" (1987, 674). Within the
public-private dichotomy, in the last halfcentury the courts have moved schools
firmly onto the public side.
From the perspective of Worthen's
functional continuum, however, the Supreme Court has placed public schools
somewhere between local governments and
purely private organizations. In its 1973
decision in San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, the Court held that local control over education is a legitimate government interest which can rationally justify
certain inequalities in funding public
schools. Earlier, in Wright v. Council of
City of Emporia, both the majority and
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dissenting opinions recognized the vital
importance of local control of education
(1972, 469, 478). Finally, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder (1972), the Court acknowledged the
critical, role parents play in assessing their
children's educational needs and interests,
and that such decisions are a matter of
individual and family privacy.
In light of these rulings, Worthen's
original continuum, extended to its fullest
degree, would yield something similar to
Figure 1. As mediating institutions,
schools and local governments fall at the
midpoint--the Aristotelian mean--between
the federal government and the family.
Consequently, schools and local governments, possessing a moderate normative
role, are uniquely suited to promote the
moderate degree of civic virtue necessary
to preserve the political system. With the
continued weakening of the American
family, the normative function of schools
becomes that much more important.
Ultimately, it is in the public schools
where both the Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions converge to make American
republicanism possible. Because of the
relative homogeneity of schools (Worthen
1991, 1294), they can easily "function as
'little republics' --tiny communities of
learning in which all participants have the
interactive opportunity . . . of developing
those 'habits of the heart' without which
there is no larger community" (Hafen
1987, 701; emphasis added). Thus, encouraging schools to function as "small
republics" fulfills the Anti-Federalist vision of intimate government and makes the
Federalist objective of effective government possible (McDowell 1987, 127).
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C. The Other Two "R's":
Schools as "Moderators" Between Rights
and Responsibilities
In addition to teaching the original
three "R's"--"reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic" --schools also must perform the
special task of instructing students in two
other "R's": rights and responsibilities.
Schools, however, have followed the
modem trend of "[enhancing] citizen rights
without effective articulation of citizen
obligations" (Janowitz 1983, ix). Such a
propensity has inevitably shifted the balance toward the federal government end of
the spectrum, a move ill-suited to the
promotion of civic virtue.
The philosophical liberalism which
imbues the language of rights is based
upon a key assumption. As illustrated by
Michael J. Sandel (1984), in its purest
form, the liberal view of rights presumes
that there is no overarching purpose or end
to any action; "the good" is simply nonexistent. Instead, the grounding principle is
the absence of any higher end prior to
rights: the right precedes the good. In
short, Sandel contends, "what matters
above all. . . are not the ends we choose
but our capacity to choose them" (1984,
86).
Values clarification, the approach to
moral education currently in vogue
(Wildavsky 1991, 46-47; Bauer 1986, 2425; Heslep 1989, 183-86), and the "behavioralization" of social studies (Janowitz
1981, 145-52) both echo these assumptions
of liberalism. Values clarification denies
any preset collection of ethics which
should guide individual behavior; instead,
it privileges the students' abilities to make
their own normative decisions. Teachers
simply ensure that students' ethical choices
are internally consistent. The behavioral
approach to social science assumes that
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people are simply objects in motion who
can be understood only through empiricism
because there is no volition guiding individual action.
While appealing, in this form the
liberal view of rights--with its corollaries
of values clarification and behaviorism--is
significantly flawed. It ignores the sharing
of traditions and community necessary in a
world where no individual is self-sufficient. Thus, "[denied] the expansive selfunderstandings that could shape a common
life, the liberal self is left to lurch between
detachment on the one hand, and entanglement on the other" (Sandel 1984, 91). At
its highest, the language of rights permits
no meaningful interaction with others,
interaction which dependent individuals
require. Ironically, this autonomy, taken
to its extreme, destroys even the rights
upon which it is grounded; of what benefit, for instance, is freedom of expression
without an audience or forum--a community--in which to express one's views?
Robert J. Nash and Robert S. Griffin
aptly summarized this position:
If individuals are only what they choose to be, if they
can detach themselves from social and historical roles
at will, if they can ignore their embedded ness in those
traditions from which they derive identity, and if
there is no telos to give life direction and purpose,
then society is little more than a collection of strangers, bereft of community and tradition, each pursuing
private interests with no restraints or sense of transcendence. We believe that this is the sum and

substance of a life without a sense of civic virtue.
(1987, 561; emphasis added)

As has been true throughout this essay,
the fullest value to both individual rights
and community sharing can be found at the
midpoint between these two ideals. This
requires that rights be tempered and balanced with responsibilities. Schools and
local governments are both tailored to
strike that balance, to teach students effec-
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tively the "lesson of moderation" (1.7)
which Publius envisioned. Returning to
Professor Worthen's continuum, at one
end, families and voluntary private organizations can be seen as promoters of responsibility; at the other, the federal and
state governments take on the role of
protectors of rights. Schools and local
governments, once again, lie in the middle
and provide the best opportunity for the
rights and responsibilities necessary for
republican government to coalesce and
thrive. With the continuing disintegration
of the family, even more of the weight for
promoting responsibility falls upon schools
and local governments.
Values clarification and behavioralism,
however, only serve to place further
weight on the rights side of the scale,
altogether ignoring the requisite responsibilities (Janowitz 1983, 146). Unless
measures are taken to restore the necessary
balance, the deleterious effects and overemphasis of rights will continue to be felt
throughout the sociopolitical environment.
For example, speaking of the need for
greater emphasis on responsibility in race
relations, Justice Dallin H. Oaks argued,
"Instead of exploring new ways to enforce
non-discrimination rights, we might be
more effective by exploring new ways to
win hearts to the proposition that each of
us has a responsibility to treat persons on
their own merits as children of God, whatever their race, creed, color, sex, or national origin" (1985, 431; emphasis in
original). I believe the same can be said
of most other aspects of social interaction.
D. Restoring the Rights/Responsibilities
Balance: A Proposed Solution
In order to be consistent with the preceding analysis, any solution to the imbalance of rights and responsibilities must be
a moderate one, lying at the midpoint
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between unfettered, individual autonomy
and the complete, authoritarian control of
education advocated by Plato in Book V of
his Republic, where the children were
removed from the society and subjected to
rigorous paramilitary training (1980, 24486). Instead, a moderate rethinking of
constitutional adjudication would allow
schools to perform their function in fostering civic virtue.
One solution which would meet this
criterion synthesizes Worthen's proposed
approach to local governments with the
method Hafen has advanced. Worthen
(1991) points out that courts already vary
their method of decision making depending
upon the right involved--some rights (for
instance, freedom of expression) receive
more weight than others. He would
"merely authorize the same consideration
for the nature of the governmental interest" (1991, 1307). Thus, in deciding if a
right has been violated, the courts would
give additional weight to a local government or school interest involved than it
would to, say, a state government because
of the greater normative function of local
governments and schools.
Hafen's (1987) proposal, though dealing specifically with freedom of expression, could easily be applied to most
school situations involving values education. He argues that the courts should
recognize an "institutional academic freedom" (1987, 722) for public schools, in
which the decisions of educators would be
presumed valid unless they go "'beyond
the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking'" (1987, 723; quoting Regents of
University of Michigan v. Ewing 1985,
515). In essence, he would advocate a
good faith exception for the institutional
decisions of educators. Any constitutional
challenge to values education simply must
meet a more stringent legal burden in
order for the program to be declared
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invalid. These two considerations would
return enough weight to the responsibility
side of the scale and would restore the
balance without mortally wounding individual rights.
Under this proposal, school districts,
with input from local citizens, would be
able to institute programs to teach certain
positive values, if they so decide. Values
which merely coincide with specific religious tenets would generally be permitted;
clear attempts at advancing sectarian doctrine, however, would necessarily meet a
higher standard of judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, through moderate public debate,
communities would be able to control what
values are being taught in their schools.
Such an experience in itself would be an
exercise in civic virtue, an activity in
which citizens would be able to think
through, change, and refine their opinions
for the good of community (McDowell
1987, 142). Shared values such as "honesty, justice, integrity, respect for the
environment, respect for others, respect
for self, compassion, due process, equality
of opportunity, peaceful resolution of
conflict, loyalty, responsible citizenship-and much, much more" (Wildavsky 1991,
48), as well as community meanings of
their practical applications, could be taught
and fostered. Moreover, courts would still
be able to address those cases in which
decisions have not been made in good
faith.
The ultimate result of such an approach, however, would be much greater
than simply allowing moral education in
public schools. The vices linked to the
unrestrained self-indulgence which plagues
our society--crimes of all types, pornography, irresponsible sexual promiscuity,
drug use, gambling, welfare dependence,
and many, many more--would all be reduced (Cannon 1981, 3-7; Bauer 1986,
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24). A situation such as the Los Angeles
incident--in which one perceived injustice
was compounded by hundreds, if not
thousands of others--would be much less
probable. The moderating effects of civic
virtue would restrain such individuals from
ignoring their internalized value system
and engaging in such destructive behavior.
E. Responding to the Objections
Adopting such an approach to moral
education would also effectively respond to
the aforementioned objections to teaching
values. First, the question, "Whose morals?" would no longer carry the weight it
now does. Because of our pluralistic
society, values and morals would inevitably differ from community to community.
Those who disagree with the values of the
community in which they live have the
option of either persuading others to allow
their views to be heard or relocating to a
community which shares their values.
Pluralism, instead of being stifled, would
actually be fostered and strengthened
(Worthen 1991).
Second, the current approach could withstand an Establishment Clause challenge
because it meets the judicial test set forth
in Lemon v. Kunzman (1971). The moral
education programs in the various communities have a "secular legislative purpose"
(1971, 612): promoting civic virtue and
citizenship, which the Court has already
recognized as a legitimate and crucial
function of schools. They "neither [advance] nor [inhibit] religion" (1971, 612);
and, unless academically unreasonable
measures are undertaken, they do not
"foster an excessive government entanglement with religion" (1971, 613).
Moreover, though certain religious
precepts (such as the Christian concept of
the Golden Rule) may be promoted, "the
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'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose
reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some
or all religions"(McGowan v. Maryland
1960, 442).
Finally, the objection based upon the
fact-value dichotomy is fatally flawed.
Elimination of all biases and preconceptions in any mode of discourse is simply
impossible because all use of language has
been previously conditioned by individual
experience. Professor David Bohn indicates:
Because there is no unconditioned language in which
an unconditioned or objective truth could be a possibility, [postmodern philosophers Gadamer and
Ricoeurl ... recognize that the horizon of understanding or tradition of discourse within which we
actually do scholarly research could never constitute a
"free market" or be characterized as a "neutral space"
in which atemporal truth reveals itself within a
controlled language of competing theories and against
indubitable methodological criteria. For this very
reason, ... every effort to make a distinction between facts and values collapses, for values are
necessarily implicit in and a guide to every mode of
discursive activity. They are an enabling condition of
every exercise of reason. (1990, 3)

Thus, certain values will always be taught,
even if by default. The approach advocated here would simply allow a full hearing
for all value systems without precluding
those that happen to coincide, for example,
with the Judeo-Christian ethic.

IV. Conclusion
The American republic was founded
upon certain ideals and principles, concepts which gave meaning to our national
experience. Unfortunately, some of those
tenets--namely, civic virtue and modera-
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tion--have given way to a self-indulging
and polarized society in which dichotomous thinking prevails. In short, the
American foundation is firm in the middle
but very weak at the "edges" (no matter
which "edge" might be popular at the
time).
By shifting the weight of our institutions away from the center of moderation
to the outside edges, the structure of our
social institutions has begun to crumble
under the pressure. As a result, the social
environment reflects serious fault lines in
American institutions. Unless America
learns the "lesson of moderation" (1.7),
particularly concerning its public schools,
the next generation will continue to learn
lessons of self-indulgence from the mass
media, youth gangs, or other misguided
institutions. By moderating our view of
the function of public schools and allowing
them to teach that same moderation in the
form of civic virtue, we can perhaps return
to the firm foundations which our institutions presuppose. Publius makes a final,
all-important admonition which may determine our success or failure:
Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you
that the people of America, knit together as they are
by so many cords of affection, can no longer live
together as members of the same family; can no
longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual
happiness; can no longer be fellow-citizens of one
great, respectable, and flourishing empire. (14.14)

Absent some effort to strengthen those
"cords of affection" (14.14), the prospects
of an enduring American polity seem bleak
indeed.
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NOTES

1.

All subsequent references to The Federalist will be given parenthetically by number and
paragraph, according to the 1987 edition, edited by Michael Loyd Chadwick.

2. I express special appreciation to Professor Worthen not only for his assistance in the
research for this essay but also his willingness to act as a sounding-board for my ideas
and to review the first draft. But, what is an uncle for (if one can't rely on family, on
whom can one rely)?

Japan, Rice, and Super 301
by Randall Allen
Japan IS an Important Amencan partner In both secunty Issues and economIc-trade Issues.
But closed Japanese markets, especially in rice, are a bone of contention between the two
countries. America's "Super 301" could be used to pressure Japan towards more open
markets, but that pressure could potentially sour U.S.-Japanese relations. The potential costs
and benefits of using Super 301 to force a more open rice market are assessed both in terms
of the economic and trade implications and in terms of the potential security implications.
The effects of Super 301 on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) negotiations is also assessed. Finally, the overall effects are examined in an effort to develop a
policy recommendation.

Thesis
Super 301 could produce positive net
effects with regard to forces for change in
Japan. Its enactment would most likely
lead to U.S. penetration of the rice market.
However, Super 301 would damage
U.S. leadership capabilities in GAIT and
represents an undemocratic approach to
international conflict resolution.
Comparative studies of 1988 Super 301
and GAIT market-opening efforts suggest
that Super 301 would not be any more
effective than GAIT, which has already
taken up the issue of liberalizing Japan's
rice market. Thus, even if Super 301 's
unique net benefits in terms of effects on
forces for change within Japan were
judged to rival the damaging costs to U.S.
overall democratic-international leadership
capability, enactment of Super 301 would
be unnecessary. That is to say, with
comparative results in terms of exports
being basically equivalent, the broader
objectives of strengthening and sustaining
the United States' leadership of global
democratic efforts such as GAIT should
take priority over the possibility of affecting rice-related forces internal to Japan. It

is arguable, however, that at least the
current threat of a rice-targeted Super 301
has prompted Japan's willingness to support the rice-liberalization negotiations in
GAIT. Thus, this threat should be maintained, for example through the activity of
pro-Super-301 elements within Congress.

I. Comments on Methodology
This analysis attempts to produce a
policy recommendation with regard to
United States international trade, ideology,
and security interests. It does not examine
why Super 301 is enacted, in terms of
various political forces internal to America.
The data upon which much of the
discussion rests is subject to some error,
both in the way it is presented and the way
in which it is used. No fundamental arguments in this essay, however, rest on fineline distinctions in quantitative data, but
rather on general trends, ensuring that the
logic of the essay can withstand possible
margins of error in data measurement or
interpretation.
Although the author began his research
with a personal political viewpoint
basically in opposition to Super 301, every
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effort was made to provide fair analysis
The sheer magnitude of Japan-U.S.
and conclusions.
trade alone would establish a sufficient
The secondary issue of ideology, which
backdrop to elevate discussion of Super
involves the discussion of
democracy, is certainly
Table 1. JapanlU.S. Trading Partners, 1989, in U.S. $ billions.
value-laden; the assumption
is that democracy is
Export -to: Japan/U.S.
Gennany
UK
France
Italy
F.S.U.
inherently good and worth
-from
supporting not only within
U.S.A.
45
17
21
7
5
12
the United States but as much
Japan
94
15
5
3
11
4
as possible in the context of
international relationships as
Source: Adapted from Farnsworth 1992,31.
well. This assumption will
be shaped and defined at the
appropriate point in the
paper. It ought to be frankly stated from
301 to a place of keen interest, but the
grave problems within the overall trade
the onset, however, that although the
relationship serve to further intensify the
assumption is debatable--even to the point
setting. The primary difficulty facing the
of providing an excellent topic for future
research--it is accepted prima facie in this
relationship is the trade imbalance, as
shown in Table 2.
paper and forms an important part of the
The causes of the trade deficit are
thesis.
several: macroeconomic factors such as
ll. Background, Framing the Issue
imbalanced interest rates and capital flows,
manufacturing quality and marketing techniques,
and internal and external barriers
The Importance of Japan, Primary Issue:
to trade. The importance of Super 301
Economics/Trade
Japan has the world's third largest
economy, behind the United States and the
former Soviet Union, with a Gross National Product of two trillion eight hundred
and ninety billion dollars (Farnsworth
1992, 11). Apart from Canada, Japan and
the United States are each other's greatest
single-nation trading partners. Table 1
compares U.S.-Japan trade and trade with
some other nations. (Farnsworth 1992,
31).
Japan is the largest market for U.S.
agricultural exports, taking in over eight
billion dollars value in 1990, with the next
country in line, Canada, only importing
half as much, approximately four billion
dollars (CRS 1992b, 1).

Table 2. Japan-U.S. Balance of Trade, 1982-92 (in
$ billions U.S.)
Year

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

1990
1991
1992·

Exports
20.7
21.6
23.2
22.2
26.6
27.8
37.4
44.5
48.6
48.1
16.0

·January - April
Source: Cooper 1992, 1.

~

37.7
41.2
57.1
68.8
81.9
84.6
89.8
93.5
89.7
91.6
31.0

Balance
-17.1
-19.6
-34.0
-46.6
-55.3
-56.8
-52.4
-49.0
-41.1
-43.4
-15.0
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rests in part in its potential to bring about
a reduction in the trade imbalance through
eliminating external barriers to trade, such
as Japan's rice-import ban.
Certainly, the economic level of interdependence as well as the difficulties of
the relationship reflected in the summary
figures above serve to define Super 301 as
a policy option dealing with high stakes
and thus calling for careful and judicious
analysis.
The Importance of Japan, Secondary Issue:
HistoryIIdeology
Japan has particular importance to the
United States as a nation whose basic
governmental and economic structure was
put into place by U.S. occupational leadership after World War II. As such, it
represents an experiment in the viability of
American Constitutional ideals, as well in
the adaptability of those ideals to forms of
culture and society drastically different
from those found in North America. It is
interesting to note the difficult struggles
erupting in several Eastern European
nations as each attempts to adopt democratic and capitalist ideals similar to those
traditionally upheld and proclaimed by the
United States. Certainly the U.S. has an
interest in the successful adoption and
establishment of such ideals globally.
Although Japan is unique in many ways
and thus not a completely universalizable
model of transition from centralized power
to freedom and democracy, it serves as
one example of a very successful transition, as guided and aided by the United
States.
Here, as with the trade issue discussed
earlier, it becomes clear that the continued
alliance and successful interaction between
the United States and Japan is of great
importance; thus, careful consideration of
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Super 301 as a dynamic policy option
becomes an exciting and critical task.
The Importance of Japan, Secondary Issue:
Security
Japan is a vital ally for the U.S. in the
Far East; the health of Japan-U.S. relationships is a key factor in maintaining
stability throughout the Pacific Rim.
While Japanese invasions of China and
Korea during World War II still leave
trailing elements of distrust, Japan's neighbors have slowly opened productive diplomatic and trade relations with their former
aggressor, assured by the commitment to
non-militarism established by Japan's
Constitution and supported by the extensive system of surrogate defense forces
placed on strategic Japanese soil by the
United States, based upon the Mutual
Security Treaty for Strategic Protection
signed in 1955 (CRS 1992a, 1).
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the
long-standing alliance lost one of its initial
purposes for existing as well as a dynamic
unifying threat throughout the Cold War
period. While Japan and the U.S. have
traveled almost far enough as global partners to forget the enmity and military
monstrosities they exchanged during World
War II, the absence of Soviet threat coupled with a general decline in bilateral
economic relations, as epitomized in the
United States' festering trade deficit,
threatens to endanger the productive and
useful security alliance.
An interesting 1990 Business Week poll
found that 68 percent of Americans
consider the Japanese economic threat to
U.S. interests greater than any military
threat from the former republics of the
Soviet Union. A different poll conducted
by the New York Times in 1989 found that
almost half of Japanese citizens believed
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that if Japan were attacked, the United
States would not help militarily (JEI 1990,
4). This polling data clearly reflect the
existence of animosity and doubt within
the U.S.-Japan security relationship.
Likewise, the symptoms of recent
breakdown in the overall Japan-U.S.
relationship clearly appear in the polling
Table 3. Poll: Japan-U.S. relations.
How would you describe relations between Japan and the United
States today?

Very Friendly
Somewhat Friendly
Somewhat
Unfriendly
Very Unfriendly

23%
65

17 %
62

5 %
68

11%
57

6

10
2

20

25
4

No Answer

5

9

6

3

Source: Adapted from JEI 1990,3-4.

data in the form of general decline over
time in positive impressions held by
Japanese and U.S. citizens toward each
other. One New York Times poll found a
discouraging trend (with one exception in
the Japanese "Very Friendly" category)
between 1985 and 1989, as reflected in
responses to the question in Table 3.
It is clear that although Japan and the
United States depend on each other as
economic, historical/ideological, and security partners, growing ill-will--in part, no
doubt, from tension over trade--threatens
to weaken the relationship. The following
analysis of Super 301 must take into account this reality.

Basic Description of Super 301
Super 301 is an amended form of
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
which originally authorized the President,
through the United States Trade Representative (USTR), to investigate unfair foreign
trade practices and increase duties or other
restrictions in retaliation when deemed
appropriate. Super 301 has only been
enacted once, as part of the 1988 Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act. It represented Congress' reaction against what was
perceived to be the too feeble and too
infrequent employment of Section 301
action by the executive branch. It mandated that the USTR annually list priority
unfair trading partners with their respective unfair trading practices. After announcing this list, the USTR was given a
12 or 18 month deadline, depending on the
type of practice, by which it had to either
acquire sufficient concessions at the negotiating table or recommend appropriate
retaliatory actions (Nanto 1991, 1-2). The
1988 Super 301 expired after two years of
implementation in 1989 and 1990. The
dominant proposal in the 102nd Congress
to re-enact Super 301, House Resolution
5100, vied to bypass the discretionary listmaking powers of the USTR in posing
mandates to specifically investigate several
nations' trade restrictions, including Japan's import ban on rice. Although H.R.
5100 failed to pass, its Democratic sponsors are expected to push similar Super
301 legislation to the decision-making
agenda in the 103rd Congress.
Super 301 is perceived generally as a
hard-hitting, decisive means of prying
open unfairly restricted foreign markets for
increased U.S. exports. This perception
stems from the condemnatory tone of the
unfair trading partner/practice list, the
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affixing of strict deadlines, and the threat
of retaliation.

sovereignty through conserving traditional
domestic production of rice (CRS 1992b,
1).

Japan and Rice: The History and Reasons
Behind the Rice Import Ban
Following World War II, Japan faced a
severe food shortage caused by forced
repatriation of Japanese nationals formerly
living outside Japan and by the collapse of
Japan's productive colonial ties throughout
the Pacific Rim. Food consumption
dropped below 1400 calories through
1950. The United States instituted land
reform, creating a small-plot farming
system with rice as the primary crop and
dietary staple. This system remains largely intact today, with part-time rice farmers
managing a meager 2.5 acres on the average. In order to protect this small-time
farming operation as a guarantee of at least
basic food security and to avoid any repeat
of the terrible post-war years of hunger
and dependence upon foreign food aid,
Japan closed its borders to any importation
of foreign rice. Though producing a highquality rice, the Japanese rice industry
passes on a consumer price of five to six
times the current world price of rice due to
the import-ban (USDA 1992, 5).
Protecting domestic rice production is
not only a reflection of food-security concerns, but also of Japanese culture. Rice
plays a central role in many Japanese
religious festivals and ceremonies, including the daily offering of bowls of rice to
deceased ancestors at family in-house'
shrines known as butsudan. Many Japanese city-dwellers maintain strong ties to
original family homes in rural areas supported in part by the income transfers
caused by the protection of the small-scale
rice farming industry. The rice-import
ban reflects a desire to maintain cultural

Japan and Rice: Forces Against Change
Both the concern for basic food security and the desire to protect home-production of one of Japan's principal cultural
items, as described above, work as strong
forces against revoking the rice-import
ban. Other forces against change exist in
addition to these two.

The Political Power of Agriculture
Despite a drastically lower level of
overall agricultural output, Japan has twice
as many farmers as the United States, 85
percent of whom are part-time farmers of
small home fields (USDA 1990, 3). The
sheer number of farmers, as well as the
cultural and historical significance of their
product, has created an entrenched
political interest group which holds tightly
to the strings of the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), which has commanded a
majority in the Japanese Congress or
"Diet" for the last 35 years. Additionally,
the Ministry of Agriculture is vehemently
opposed to trade liberalization, as it serves
a basic constituency which is
internationally non-competitive. Pressure
from the ministry, coupled with longstanding financial and voting support of
the LDP by the agricultural community
have proven to set Japan's rice ban up as a
firm and lasting symbol of resistance to
change (Aheam 1989, 24). To appease
the agriculture lobby, the Diet has adopted
several resolutions expressing opposition to
rice liberalization (Asahi 1992, 3). The
defeat of a pro-rice-market liberalization
LDP candidate by a somewhat obscure
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opposition party candidate this year was
precipitated by a backlash against the LDP
candidate in nine out of ten rice-producing
counties. Hiromu Nonaka, chief of the
LDP election bureau observed, "[The]
major factor responsible for the defeat of
the LDP ... candidate in the ... election
was the rice issue" (2).
It is very difficult for pro-trade liberalization politicians and bureaucrats in Japan
to formulate a strong enough coalition to
overcome the agricultural interest's hold
over such status quo protectionist policies
as the rice ban. When Keidanren, the
largest big business advocacy group in
Japan, openly opposed protectionist agricultural policy in 1984, a grass-roots
movement mobilized to boycott all products produced by companies affiliated with
Keidanren, promptly producing a formal
apology and a recanting of the suspect
criticism (Ahearn 1989, 56-7).
The Power of the Status Quo
A final broad force against rice liberalization is the inherent Japanese societal
esteem for the status quo. A May 1990
poll conducted by the Japanese Prime
Minister's office found that approximately
90 percent of Japanese households consider
themselves "middle-class" (Farnsworth
1992, 86). Raymond Ahearn, a specialist
in trade relations at the U.S. Library of
Congress, observes, "[t]his has been interpreted to mean that the vast majority of
Japanese have achieved a measure of
material well-being and are basically satisfied with the way they live" (Ahearn 1989,
57).
This contentment translates into a force
against economic change and the feared
upheaval of rural communities economically tied to the import ban.
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Japan and Rice: Forces for Change
Food Security and Trade
Despite resistance, several forces for
liberalization of the rice market exist. To
begin, with regard to the food-security
justification for the rice ban, it is notable
that rice consumption has fallen by onethird since 1960, while other dietary elements such as meat, eggs, and dairy, have
tripled and quintupled (See Table 4.)
As Japanese citizens substitute foods
such as beef and bread as significant elements in their basic food plan, rice loses
ground as the mainstay of the Japanese
diet and, thus, the main source of basic
nutrition and food-security.
Additionally, Japan runs an approximate annual trade deficit of 30 billion
dollars in basic foodstuffs (Farnsworth
1992, 33). Coupled with dietary shifts
explained above, this serves to deflate the
arguments in favor of the protection of
rice as a food-security guarantee, in that
true food security is becoming increasingly
dependent upon diverse food products and
thus reliant on secure and healthy trade
relations, which the ban works against.
This translates into a force in favor of
flexibility and cooperation with important
agricultural trading partners like the
United States.
Table 4. Japanese dietary characteristics
(kg/yr).

Meat
Eggs
Dairy
Fish
Rice
Wheat

1960

1985

5
5
22
28
117
26

25
15
67
36
75
32

Source: USDA 1990, 9.
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The "Me" Generation
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The question of removing Japan's riceimport ban in order to improve trade
relations with the U. S., however, summons criticism but shows a smaller differential between basic supportive and oppositional opinions toward protection (Table
7) than Table 6 shows in dealing with
agricultural in general.
This data suggests that removal of the rice
ban, although not supported outright by
dominant public opinion, finds noteworthy
support and a less daunting level of resistance than with agricultural market liberalization broadly speaking.

The cultural underpinnings of rice
protection are challenged by rising consumerism, or the "Me" generation. The
post-World War II generation has known
less of hardship or sacrifice, and is bent on
consuming as much as possible, regardless
of whether a good is domestically
produced or imported. It feels less loyalty
to traditions of domestic production of
goods such as rice, and is not easily
reconciled to the enormous costs of
Japan's rice policy (Ahearn 1989, 46).
The average yearly transfers to rice farmers paid by consumers through higher
Table 5. Poll: Japan, u.s. attitudes toward protectionrice prices was estimated in 1986 at
ism in general.
approximately 2,621 billion yen, or
roughl y 14 billion dollars according to
As a measure for protecting [Japanese! American) industry, there
the exchange rate at that time (USDA
are such ways as to impose a high tariff or a surcharge on
1990, 23). High yen rates have also had
imported goods, or restrict imports in quantity. Do you think
a significant impact on the general
that these measures are to be taken as a matter of course, or do
you think that [Japan! America) ought not to do so? (Japanese
attractiveness of imported goods, adding
were asked about Japan's trade policies; Americans were asked
to the overall consumer leanings toward
about U.S. trade policies.)
support of trade liberalization (Ahearn
U.S.
Japan
1989, 61).
Measures ought to be taken
Public Opinion

Polling data reveal the existence of a
significant though not majority level of
Japanese public sentiment against protectionist trade barriers in general.
Although relatively equivalent proprotection sentiment exists, the polls
reflect a slightly greater orientation toward
free trade among Japanese than among
Americans (Table 5), supporting the
hypothesis that Japanese public opinion
will tend to be a force for change in the
future.
Among Japanese, protection of the
agriculture industry, however, seems to
enjoy considerably stronger support than
protectionism in general (Table 6).

as a matter of course

43.2 %

66.1 %

Ought not to do so

40.5

23.2

Other
No Answer

2.5
13.8

1.1
9.7

The Strong Yen

An additional force for change exists in
the strong value of the yen. Beginning in
1985, the value of the yen increased drastically, nearly doubling in three years. This
led to relative drop in the price of imports
generally, followed by a corresponding
boom in demand. This has contributed to
rising consumer consciousness and changing consumer tastes, with a general movement toward greater levels of awareness,
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acceptance, and preference of foreign
goods (Ahearn 1989, 30, 61).
Table 6. Poll: Japanese attitudes toward protection of agriculture.
About "importing agricultural products, • there are
two opinions. A: 'It will be better to go on
importing inexpensive agricultural products.' B: 'In
order to protect the country's domestic agriculture,
it is a matter of course to restrict imports.' Which
opinion is closer to your view (1989)?
Closer to opinion A
Closer to opinion B
Other
No Answer

32.4 %
59.4
2.0
6.1

Source: Adapted from JE11990, 8.

Table 7. Poll: Japanese attitudes toward
removing the rice import ban.
Now, do you favor or oppose the Japanese
government taking any of these measures to
improve relations with America?
Removing
the ban
on imports

Favor Oppose Not Sure
39 % 48 %
13 %

Source: Adapted from JEI 1990,8.

Views and Decisions of Some Japanese
Political Leaders

Some political momentum for change
has been created in recent statements of
prominent Japanese political figures. In
January of 1992, for example, Kiichi
Miyazawa, Japan's prime minister at the
time, argued publicly that rice imports
would not damage the agricultural incomes
significantly. Also, Michio Watanabe,
Japan's Foreign Minister, argued in favor
of rice market liberalization. Additionally,
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factional heads of the LDP reportedly
entered into an informal agreement to
support rice liberalization. However, due
to the constant threat of backlash from the
agriculture lobby, such statements of support have been followed by equivocation
(Asahi 1992, 3).
In April of this year, for the first time
ever, the Japanese government allowed the
U.S. Department of Agriculture to include
rice in an annual food fair exhibition in
Tokyo. Just one year ago at the same
event, U. S. officials were forced to remove U.S. rice from the exhibit at the
threat of arrest. This change seems to
reflect a weakening in the severity of
traditional government opposition to the
possibility of foreign rice importation
(Tokyo Kyodo 1992).

m.

CostlBenefit Analysis of Super 301

Vis-A-Vis Effects on Forces ForI Against
Change
Super 301 and Forces for Change

Because of its confrontational tone,
Super 301 is a very dramatic and highly
publicized policy movement. A rice-targeted Super 301 would affect and increase
in the volume of Japan's public debate
about the rice issue in general. To the
extent that such public debate were to
include accurate reflections of the overall
food security situation, including figures
on Japan's heavy dependence on U.S.
imports of various basic foodstuffs, and
increase in concern for healthy and peaceable agricultural trade relations could
increase pressure to appease the U. S. and
allow rice importation. To the extent that
such public debate were to stress the extremely high comparative price Japanese
consumers pay for rice because of the
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import ban, the "Me" generation could
respond with additional pressure to open
the border to imports in hopes that despite
likely high tariffs, prices would eventually
decrease.
It is possible that the threat of retaliation implicit in Super 301 could play into
the hands of LDP leaders who favor elimination of the ban. The political damage
inherent in offending the agriculture lobby
if trade concessions were extended to the
Table 8. Poll: Japan-U.S. relations, 1985 and
1989.
How would you describe relations between Japan
and the United States today?
U.S.
1985 1989
14 % 17 %

Japan
1985 1989
2 %
II %

Somewhat
Friendly

59

62

52

57

Somewhat
Unfriendly

14

10

40

25

Very
Unfriendly

3

2

3

4

No Answer

10

9

3

3

Very Friendly

Source: Adapted from JEI 1990,3-4.

United States could be lessened if the press
were to emphasize the costs to national
prosperity that could be incurred if Super
301 demands were unappeased and punitive measures such as increased trade
restrictions on Japanese exports followed.
Each of the above scenarios is speculative and, thus, less than ideal grounding
for a supportive recommendation of Super
301. However, a closer look at two conditions in Japan suggests that the scenarios
may be less specUlative than they originallyappear. First, key elements within the

LDP have expressed qualified support of
rice-market liberalization, as described
earlier. Second, the Japanese press is
highly influenced and monitored by government leadership. Newsworthy events
are funnelled to the press through exclusive reporter clubs organized and maintained within each government entity or
agency (Gibney 1985, 244). Powerful
government officials in favor of liberalization could use the leverage inherent in this
governmental press club structure to disseminate information helpful to their
cause.
However, the unilateral, bully-like
approach of Super 301 could damage
Japanese public sentiment toward the U.S.,
inciting a Japanese nationalist backlash
strong enough to eclipse the above forces
for change. As Table 3 indicates, goodwill between the United States and Japan
has been declining. Table 3, however,
shows only the first and last years of a
five-year annual survey; good-will actually
showed an increase between 1988 and
1989 (Table 8), suggesting that the 1988
Super 301 at least did not cause immediate
harm to public opinion; it could have even
had a positive effect, although the reasoning behind response data is not indicated,
so any link to Super 301 one way or another is less than sure.
The only force for change yet to be
discussed, the strength of the yen, does not
lend itself to this analysis of the positive
and negative effects of Super 301. The
impact on exchange rates and thus on
import prices would most likely be ambiguous, depending on numerous variables
beyond the scope of this research.

Super 301 and Forces Against Change
As describe above, Super 301-induced
media discussion of the rice-import ban
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could heighten the realization of Japan's
import dependence on the United States for
significant levels of basic food-stuffs; this
could weaken the long-standing resistance
to change based on increasingly outdated
conceptions of food security based on rice
alone, as described earlier.
On the other hand, despite shifting
dietary patterns, rice remains a central
player in the food security tradition of
post-World War II Japan and is perhaps
inseparably linked with the poignant memory of Japan's struggle to overcome postWorld War II helplessness. Rice, with its
peculiar historical role, coupled with its
cultural and religious significance, may
provide for a different, more defensive
public response as a Super 301 target than
did the 1988 Super 301 's targets: supercomputers, satellites, and wood products.
However, the polling data seem to indicate
a decrease in the likelihood of such a
special case. As described earlier, the
comparison of Table 6 and Table 7 reveal
a slightly smaller differential between
support and opposition of protection with
regard to rice than with regard to agriculture in general; thus, rice, despite its
historical and cultural distinction, does not
seem to enjoy special public deference
when it comes to the import-ban policy.
The political power of agriculture is
likely to oppose trade liberalization regardless of the way in which it is brought to
the decision-making agenda. As described
earlier, even when the largest indigenous
business advocacy group in Japan sought
to wield its power against agricultural
protectionism, grass-roots lobbying crippled the effort and brought Keidanren to
its knees. The unbending resolve of entrenched agricultural interests will not
respond positively to proposals to weaken
protection regardless of location or struc-
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ture of the source, foreign or domestic,
Super 301 or GATT negotiations.
The only force against change yet to be
discussed, the power of the status quo--as
defined and developed in this paper, would
likely see only negligible effects due to the
introduction of Super 301; for it to be
otherwise, a significant number of Japanese would have to be affected by the
Super 301 effort adversely enough to
change their basic perceptions of their own
socio-economic status. Such perception
shifts are possible in the long-run if Super
301 were to induce rice-market liberalization and cause some economic adjustments
in rural communities (although it should be
remembered that on the average, 85 percent of farming households' income comes
from non-farm sources; thus, the effects of
lower rice prices due to replacing the ban
with tariffs and allowing some imports,
could arguably be modest). To restate,
after-effects of actual policy changes could
cause some shifts in the support of the
status quo, due to perceptions of relative
economic well-being, but the direct impact
of Super 301 initiation on the same would
be ambiguous. Even if there were to be a
certain long-term socio-economic perception shift as hypothesized, it would be
difficult to predict how that shift would
pan out with respect to public policy; for
example, if farming households were hurt
significantly enough, change in the direction of returning to heavy agricultural
protection may be sought. Alternatively,
shifts in the economy may produce a more
general weakening of the Japanese resistance to change in any form, thus opening
the door wider to debate on various market
reforms.
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Costs/Benefits Vis-A-Vis Secondary Issues
Super 301 and History/Ideology
The ensuing discussion rests on the
following assumption: democratic principles can apply in similar ways to the governing relationships between nations as it
can to the governing relationships within
nations. The position of this paper is that
to some extent, this assumption is true.
There is considerable support of such in
the establishment and activity of such
governing systems as the United Nations
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, both of which were founded and
are sustained through the significant involvement of the United States.
Because of unique post-World War II
interaction, the United States and Japan
together exemplify the expansion, adaptation, and success of democracy. The
fundamental principle of democracy could
be defined as follows: Equal standing,
consent, and panicipation of the basic
entities governed, both in the original
structuring of rules and in the ongoing
decision-making processes. If Super 301
creates a situation which contradicts this, it
represents in some ways a departure from
democratic ideals. The cost of such a
departure would be difficult to quantify.
At this crucial time in global history,
however, when numerous new nations are
experiencing bitter struggles on their individual roads toward democratic reform, an
example of steadiness and strength from
Japan and the United States, the world's
most prominent leaders, in their commitment to the fundamentals of democratic
conflict resolution even in the face of
difficult economic tensions, would be of
great value.
Inasmuch as the goal of Super 301 is
aimed at creating equal standing and par-
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ticipation in the economic relationship, it
could be said that its end is the perpetuation of the fundamental democratic principles as defined. However, the means of
Super 301 represent a stark departure
therefrom. First of all, the rules of the
game, involving definitions of unfair trading practices and the deadlines for concessions are made strictly unilaterally, by the
United States. Although the definitions
may arguably be accurately assigned and
the deadlines fairly chosen, Super 301 is
undemocratic in that the basic structure of
the negotiation process is not formulated
with equal standing and consent of one of
the basic entities to be governed thereby:
Japan. The United States has the ability
and liberty as a sovereign nation to make
such demands on Japan, but those demands
are not democratic in nature and thus
represent a possible ideological shift of
sorts. If Japan were to refuse to engage in
more democratic negotiation, such a unilaterally directed course of action would be
more justifiable. However, several existing avenues for more democratic negotiation are welcomed and fully participated in
by the Japanese, including the Strategic
Impediments Initiative and GATT.
The failure of these forums of debate
to adequately or fairly address the rice
issue would likewise provide greater justification for the United States to vie for the
unilateral approach of Super 301. However, rice is currently a primary subject of
negotiation in the Uruguay Round of
GATT. The Dunkel proposal, which was
agreed upon by the nations of GATT in
January as the working basis for final
rounds of negotiation, includes a proposal
for the elimination of Japan's rice-import
ban, the very goal of Super 301 (Hanrahan
1992, 10).
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Super 301 and Security
It is difficult to assess the impact of
Super 301 on the important security relationship shared by the United States and
Japan. This paper will only touch briefly
one possible Super 30 I-security link provided by public opinion, with the following assumption: Healthy security relations
are supported by positive public opinion
reciprocated between the nations in the
security relationship.
As discussed earlier, there has been a
steady decline in optimism regarding U. S.Japan relations. If Super 301 were to
open markets such that U.S. exports increased significantly enough to ease the
trade imbalance and, thus, the overall
tension of the economic relationship, the
indirect impact on the security relationship
through improved public opinion would be
positive.
As described earlier, public opinion
showed general improvement between
1988 and 1989. It appears, then, that
Super 301 at least did not have any significant negative impact on public opinion.
Although the importance of Japan with
regard to stability in the Pacific Rim and
the maintenance of U.S. bases on strategic
Japanese territory is great enough to warrant the examination of the possible impact
of Super 301 on security, public opinion
provides only an indirect impact assessment. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to
state that the data seem to vindicate Super
301 of at least the potential cost of negatively impacting public opinion significantly enough to cause any decline in the
health of the security relationship.

Pi Sigma Alpha Review 38

Costs/Benefits Vis-A-Vis the Primary
Issue: Economics/Trade

Super 301 Effects on U. S. Expons and the
Trade Imbalance
Estimates of possible sales of U.S. rice
in Japan if Super 301 were to succeed in
pressuring Japan to lift its import ban run
as high as 656 million dollars (Cooper
1992, 3).
It is possible, however, that other
countries, especially countries like Thailand who produce a type of rice very
similar to Japanese rice, could seize a
significant portion of a newly opened
market. Also, U.S. exports across the
board could suffer slightly if Super 301
action, which might not deal only with
rice, but with other sectors such as automobiles as well, served to reinforce a
general perception among Japanese consumer that only through hard-line government pressure can U.S. goods be moved in
Japan, that U.S. goods seem incapable of
selling themselves based simply on qUality.
Dick Nanto, a Specialist in Industry and
Trade at the U.S. Library of Congress
sees evidence of this perception in the
comparative success of U. S. auto sales. In
1990, for example, the U.S. Big Three
sold 15,975 autos, the British 19,653, and
the Germans 127,442 (Nan to 1991, 23).
With respect to rice specifically, however,
U.S. government action to overturn Japan's complete ban and allow the introduction of U.S. rice into the market would be
less likely to reinforce such consumer
doubts of quality. Thus, it would be a
mistake to assign Super 301 with respect
to rice (the focus of this paper) costs of
this kind.
Additional costs, however, to U.S.
exports could be incurred were Super 301
on rice to fail to produce concession and

39 Pi Sigma Alpha Review

thus follow its own designated coarse to
retaliatory trade restrictions which could
lead to an international trade war, and thus
to decreased u.S. exports. In the case of
1988's Super 301, however, no such retaliatory actions were taken in the case of
India, which along with Japan, had been
targeted, but who unlike Japan, refused to
produce concessions. The USTR simply
refused to recommend sanctions. Although
a repeat of this balk would serve to create
an image of Super 301 as an idle threat, it
is important to note that precedent provides the USTR with considerable discretion, such that a trade war resulting from
unappeased Super 301 action is not unavoidable.
A final question of costs involves
Super 301 's focus on obvious, external
barriers to trade. While a large portion of
the problems faced by U. S. exports to
Japan lie with direct and indirect internal
barriers to trade such as Japan's distribution system, land-prices, anti-trust laws,
and savings rates, Super 301 would serve
to shift the focus away from these key
items. However, the heated interchange
between u.S. and Japanese trade officials
which immediately resulted from 1988
passage of Super 301 spawned the Structural Impediments Initiative, a bilateral
negotiation forum whose purpose was to
focus on these very internal barriers.
Therefore, Super 301' s potential costs in
this area ought rather to be expressed as
potential indirect benefits (Ahearn 1990,
29).
Even if Super 301 is successful in
creating the estimated 656 million in U.S.
rice exports, that would only amount to a
1 percent reduction of the overall U.S.
trade deficit. Accordingly, Super 301
should not be viewed as a means to
decisively tum-around the troubled JapanU.S. economic relationship. Nevertheless,
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the incremental effect would be a positive
step, and the increased sales would provide
specific benefits to the rice-growing industry in the United States.
Comparative Analysis: 1988 Super 301 v.
GAIT Agreement

The ability of Super 301 to produce
Japanese market access in specifically
targeted areas can be analyzed by comparing the corresponding ability of an alternative method of negotiation. Such an alternative model was provided in the same
year as the enactment of the original Super
301, 1988, when the GATT-ll Agreement
was secured. Super 301 centered on three
U.S. export sectors deemed to be unfairly
inhibited in Japan: supercomputers, wood
products, and satellites. GATT-II dealt
with eleven agricultural products.
Both the Super 301 and the GATT
processes have produced some positive
results. A cross-analysis of quantitative
data is difficult for two reasons, however.
First, although Super 301 was enacted in
1988, it produced only agreements to
negotiate at the time, rather than actual
trade agreements as with GATT (which
had been debated for two years previous to
the agreement) (Nanto 1992, 14). The
Super 301-spawned negotiation process
then took two to four years until specific
settlements in each sector were signed.
Not enough time has passed to know the
actual quantitative effects of those settlements. Second, because the Super 301
and GATT agreements dealt with different
economic sectors, comparing results even
when enough time passes will be a difficult
task, since numerous variables affect different economic sectors in unique ways.
For example, ketchup imports may show a
greater increase than satellites, yet the
reason for this may not be the comparative
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effectiveness of the different negotiation
forums but rather the impact of direct
national security concerns on the satellite
market, wherein the Japanese government
must protect viable domestic production
capabilities. Even more fundamentally,
export quantities are not affected only by
trade agreements, but by overall fluctuations in the international market, including
changing exchange rates and levels of
supply and demand.
It can be demonstrated, however, at
least, that both methods of trade negotiation seemed to have produced some positive results. At the same time, neither
seemed to have produced all of its goals
fully. GAIT-11 directed the removal of
some quotas and the liberalization of most
other import restrictions on 11 agricultural
products. Experts in the Library of Congress provide the following summary
analysis of available data:

u.s. exports of most of the negotiated GATT agricultural products have increased since the agreement was
signed in 1988. Some exports have increased significantly, while several have declined. Since the GATT11 agreement, the ketchup and tomato sauce category
increased the most dramatically, by 107 %. Other
category increases were much less significant, such as
sugars and syrups increasing by 16 % and fruits and
purees increasing by 34 %. The overall change in
U.S. exports of these 11 agricultural categories from
1988 to 1991 amount to a 10 % increase. U.S.
exports in the dried beans, peanuts, and pineapples
categories declined since 1988. (Nanto 1992, 14)
It is apparent that effective results were
gained with some notable exceptions.
Restrictions, however, remained on some
dairy products, despite the formal 1988
agreement, and negotiation to remove
these were ongoing as late as April of
1992 (Nanto 992, 14).
Similar results occurred in the case of
Super 301, where the original enactment
against Japan first aroused a refusal to
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negotiate according to the U. S. -determined
deadlines for concessions and retaliation;
the Japanese, however, agreed to at least
discuss their disagreements at the negotiating table, if the U. S. agreed to abandon
the Super 301 structure. Thus, although
altered from the original course, negotiations produced some progress.
Since that original period, a preliminary wood-product agreement was reached
in 1990 (JEN 1990, 10). Insufficient
subsequent market penetration, however,
spawned continued negotiation in 1991
(lEN 1991, 39) and in 1992 during the
Bush trade mission (When mouth 1992,
24). Thus, Super 301 lead to negotiations,
an agreement, and some initial penetration,
but that penetration failed to reach ideal
levels that the USTR negotiations had
targeted; arbitration continued and more
conclusive results are yet to be seen.
An agreement on supercomputers was
reached in March of 1990 which provided
for the opening up of eight major governmental contracts to bids from U.S. firms
(Connelly 1990, 1). Despite the agreement, however, bid-rigging in favor of
domestic firms reportedly continued and
was under investigation by the House
Government Operations National Security
subcommittee in July of 1992 (Robertson
1992, 6). Similar to GAIT-11 and to the
Super 301 wood-products scenarios, the
Super 301-induced supercomputer negotiations have produced some progress but
have failed to produce ideal levels of free
market access and export penetration.
The same type of pattern appears in the
Super 301 satellite sector. Whereas March
of 1990 brought the Japan Satellite Accord
Sales Pact with promised open competition
for U.S. satellite firms in Japan, April of
the same year saw controversy regarding a
Japanese government contract offered only
to a domestic firm. Only with threats of
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general trade retaliation did the Japanese
government agree to open the contract to
bids from u.S. firms (Jones 1991, 3).
In conclusion, it is difficult to discern
distinct differences in result when comparing the different forums for negotiation,
Super 301 and GATT. A similar pattern
of gained concession coupled with drawnout negotiation and conflict resolution
develops in either case. 1

Effects of Super 301 on GATT
Proponents of H.R. 5100 argue that
one benefit of Super 301 would be to
" ... get the Uruguay Round moving forward ... " (U.S. Congress. Housel992, 60).
Raymond Ahearn of the Library of Congress, however, points out the alternative
viewpoint that" ... Super 301 could torpedo
the GATT" (Ahearn 1990, 42). The likely
effect of a present-day Super 301 can be
analyzed by exploring the effect of the
1988 Super 301. In a special session of
GATT in June of 1989, over forty countries, including Finland, Canada, Mexico,
Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil, Japan,
Israel, and the European Community made
statements condemning U.S. use of Super
301, claiming it violated the rules and
spirit of cooperative negotiation under
GATT. Although technical debate over
the statutes governing GATT has failed to
produce any definitive ruling on the legal
propriety of Super 301, the overwhelming
rejection of its unilateral tactics by members of GATT suggest at least a high
degree of hostility, though it may likewise
suggest the true pressure-creating capability of Super 301 which could force compromise in the GATT. This pressure,
though, has created what Raymond Ahearn
describes as ". . . suspicio[n] and in some
cases ... derision ... [from] many U.S.
trading partners" (Ahearn 1990, 25).
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Thus, it appears that Super 301 damages
the overall respectability and cooperative
influence of the United States, though it
may provide some leverage.
With regard to Japan's rice-import ban
specifically, Japanese officials have recognized that the desired successful completion of the Uruguay Round (which would
benefit Japan immensely with regard to
various aspects of the proposed agreement
-- for example, GATT regulation of intellectual property protection and the formulation of a Multilateral Trade Organization
designed to administer trade-dispute resolution) might require Japanese compromise
on the rice issue, thus Super 301 pressure
seems to be unneeded. However, it could
be alternatively argued that the positive
posturing of Japan with regard to rice
compromise in the round is a result of fear
of Super 301 action were the round to fail.
Thus, although it appears that Super 301
undermines the overall negotiating leadership position of the United States in
GATT, it is possible that at least the threat
of Super 301 might contribute some positive pressure for compromise.
Net Effects: Toward a Policy Recommendation
To recap, Super 301 could produce
some positive net effects on forces for
change with regard to rice in Japan. The
high-profile approach of Super 301 could
lead, through media coverage of the overall rice issue, to a heightened public
awareness of both Japan's reliance for
food security on healthy trade relations as
well as the costliness of the import ban.
Pro-rice market liberation elements within
the LDP could foster and utilize such
opportunities for media influence to create
a political atmosphere more open to
change despite the entrenched and unmov-
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ing agriculture lobby. Although it is
possible that the unilateral attack of Super
301 on rice, one of Japan's cultural icons,
could induce a public backlash, the last
Super 301 enactment in 1988 saw no such
negative reaction, and polling data indicate
no uniquely high levels of public resistance
to removal of the rice ban.
Super 301 would likely have no significant effect on security relations, based on
the indirect link of public opinion.
When comparing the 1988 Super 301
and GAIT efforts, a equivalent pattern of
qualified success coupled with frustration
and dragged-out negotiation develops.
That is to say, despite its ambitious, hardline approach, Super 301 appears to be no
more effective in terms of increased exports than GAIT. (When enough time
passes to reveal sufficient quantitative data
in the more recently settled Super 301
sectors, a more detailed comparison would
be helpful in testing this conclusion.)
Enactment of Super 301 in 1988
brought widespread protest against the
United States in GAIT, damaging the
United States' general position of respect
and leadership. (Here, as well, a more
detailed analysis of the negotiation dynamics of GAIT would be a helpful avenue of
further research.)
Furthermore, Super 301 represents an
undemocratic approach to international
conflict resolution. Super 301 benefits
with regard to forces for change must be
weighed against these costs. Additionally,
it must be taken into account that Japan
has expressed qualified support of riceliberalization provisions presently before
GAIT in the form of the Uruguay
Round's Dunkel proposal. This suggests
that a GAIT agreement on rice is attainable, and that if the 1988 GAIT-Super
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301 comparisons are accurate, such a
GAIT agreement would likely yield
roughly equivalent results as would a ricetargeted Super 301. Thus, even if Super
301 's unique net benefits in terms of effects on forces for change within Japan
were judged to rival the damaging costs to
the U.S.' overall democratic-international
leadership capability, enactment of Super
301 would be unnecessary. With the
comparative results in terms of exports
being basically equivalent, the broader
objectives of strengthening and sustaining
the United States' leadership of global
democratic efforts should take priority
over the possibility of affecting rice-related
forces internal to Japan.
It is arguable that at least the current
threat of a rice-targeted Super 301, however, has prompted Japan's willingness to
support the rice-liberalization negotiations
in GAIT. Thus, this threat should be
maintained, for example through highprofile activity and lobbying of pro-Super
301 elements of Congress, though these
efforts must not be allowed to lead to
enaCtment of Super 301.
IV. Conclusion
Although the secondary issue of ideology seems only to offer an abstract context
for discussion of Super 301, it provides, in
a way, the basis for the policy recommendation of this paper: that Japanese riceliberalization be sought through GAIT
rather than through Super 301. That is to
say, because GAIT seems to be no more
effective than unilateral actions such as
Super 301 in producing specific sector
export-expansion results, the ultimate
foundation of an argument against Super
301 rests on the assertion that democratic
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conflict-resolution is worth maintaining
and exemplifying in the global setting. A
comprehensive study of the philosophical
considerations as well as the broader quan

titative implications (beyond the narrow
context of increasing export penetration) of
this assertion constitute an important avenue for further research.
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Term limits: A Message to Congress
by Robert Karlinsey
Over the past few years publIc sentiment has rapIdly grown In favor of hmItIng allowable
terms in office for elected federal officials. In many states measures have already passed
limiting senators of representatives to a specified number of terms. Understanding term
limits requires an understanding of the arguments proponents use to support their passage and
of arguments opponents use to resist their passage. While term limits will probably decrease
"careerism" and incumbent return rate in national politics, they constitute only a brief and
periodic solution to the problem. Reforms in campaign finance laws might strike closer to
the cause of careerism that has so many Americans upset.

On 7 November 1991, the most
stinging term limit initiative ever to be
considered was on the ballot in
Washington State. Setting a record for
statewide turnout during an off-year
election, Washington voters decided
against having term limits imposed on
elected federal officials (Egan 1991).
Washington's United States Representative
and Speaker of the House Tom Foley
worked hard for the measure's defeat--if
passed, the term limitations would be
retroactive, meaning that Tom Foley, a
long time United States Representative
since 1965, would be automatically ousted
in the next election. Knowing this, Foley
campaigned vigorously, using scare tactics
such as the possibility that the Washington
delegation would lose its seniority and
influence in Congress. Speaker Foley
didn't have to say much to get his point
across; in fact, his most effective speech
was just one word: "California." This
word was especially poignant because most
everyone knew that California was a huge,
powerful state that had the potential to
walk allover smaller states like
Washington. Foley claimed that
Washington's only defense against states
like California, its seniority power in
Congress, would be lost if Washingtonians

voted "yes" on the proposition (Will 1992,
222).
This was not the first time that term
limits had appeared in state-wide elections.
In 1990, California, Colorado, and
Oklahoma voted in favor of term limits.
Colorado, however, was the only state out
of the three that voted to limit the terms of
federal offices.
Thanks to the term limit measure's
defeat in Tom Foley's state, proponents of
term limits nationwide learned a valuable
lesson: If term limit measures are to pass,
they cannot be too harsh (i.e., retroactive).
Following the Washington episode,
advocates of the term limit movement
rolled up their sleeves and went to work.
By the 1992 general election, 14 states had
term limit measures on their ballots, and
none of them were punitive or retroactive
like the guinea pig measure that had failed
the previous year in Washington.
Never before had the same issue been
voted on at the same time in so many
states (Gross 1992). This clearly reflected
a sour mood and a desire for change that
had been accumulating throughout the
nation. In particular, the public was tired
of a Congress that was seen as an
entrenched institution in need of a major
overhaul. The House Banking and Post
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Office scandals, the embarrassing way in
which Senators handled the Clarence
Thomas hearings, a national debt of $4
trillion (Rudolph et al. 1992), porkbarreling, and other practices contributed
to the Ubiquitous, anti-incumbent
atmosphere.
On the day of the general election, 3
November 1992, all 14 of the term limit
measures passed. Colorado was no longer
the lone federal term-limit state; it was
now one among 15 states that had passed
term limits for federal offices. However,
voters of those same states who said "yes"
to term limits also sent their incumbent
candidates back to Capitol Hill.
Nationwide, 93 percent of the incumbents
seeking reelection won their races. It was
as if voters were sending the bizarre
message, "Stop me before I vote again"
(Woshinsky 1992, 19).
All 15 of the term-limiting states
prevent Senators from serving for more
than 12 years, and the limitations on
House members varies with each state.
Eight of the 15 states restrict their
Representatives to serving for no more
than 6 years, 4 set the limit at 8 years, and
3 prevent ballot access after 12 years of
service in the House.
With advocates in Utah working to
have a term limit measure on the ballot in
time for the state's next election, Utahns
will begin to see the debate gain more
prominence. As it does gain more
attention, the arguments for and against
term limits will be made, and Utah voters
will have the chance to weigh both sides.
This paper will explore four areas of the
term limit issue. First, it will examine the
popUlarity and success of the term limit
movement. Second, the relationship
between ideology and term limit approval
will be explored. Third, arguments for
and against term limits will be presented.
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Fourth, a case will be made in favor of
alternative measures to term limits, with
an emphasis on campaign finance reform.

The Success of the Tenn Limit
Movement
The term limit movement has definitely
gained momentum. Term limit groups are
already circulating petitions in the six
remaining states that have initiative access.
Although proponents are pleased with their
initiative success, their ultimate goal is a
constitutional amendment that would
legalize term limits for federal offices
throughout the entire nation. Since the
1992 term limit measures passed in all 14
states, the possibility for an amendment is
greatly enhanced. "I would be very
surprised if Congress had the nerve to
deny it [passage of the amendment] at this
point," said James Coyne, co-chairman of
an interest group called Americans to
Limit Congressional Terms (Holmstrom
1992, 5).
Whether or not term limits make it
through the amendment process, the public
seems to be in favor of them. In the 1992
KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll, 82 percent
of Utah voters said "yes" to term limits
(margin of error is about 2 percent).
Therefore, it is likely that if Utah held an
off-year election today, a measure limiting
the terms of federal officials would pass.
Similarly, voters nationwide also seemed
to be in favor of term limits. A national
survey conducted by the Gallup
Organization showed that 67 percent of
those polled were in favor of term limits
(Jimmerson 1993).
It is also interesting to note that Utah's
first congressional district voters were in
harmony with the "stop me before I vote
again" paradox common to other states in
the nation: Jim Hansen, a Congressman
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going into his seventh term, was reelected.
Of those that voted for Hansen, 84 percent
approved term limits. This type of
behavior is found in many American
voters that say "Clean up Congress! Get
those bums out of there--except for my
Congressman, of course. He's the only
honest one in the bunch."
Although the term limit movement has
gained nation-wide popularity, some feel
that this momentum is based on a shaky
foundation, namely, public discontent with
government. If the Clinton Administration
can change the public's current view on
government, term-limit supporters may
dissipate quicldy (Galvin 1992).
The Influence of Ideology on the Tenn
Limit Movement
Although the length of term limits
varies from state to state, the proponents
seem to share common attitudes, and in
particular, the movement sends a whiff of
conservatism. This conservative influence
exists for at least two reasons. First,
many if not most conservatives are of the
Republican persuasion; lawmakers of this
party have been unable to control Congress
for quite a while (except for their brief
stint in the Senate in the early 1980's), and
they hope that term limits will help. to shift
the majority into Republican hands.
Second, conservatives believe in the
concept of limited power in government;
enacting term limits, they believe, will put
a stop to the accumulation of power that
the so-called "professional" or "career"
politicians acquire.
Evidence of conservative overtones in
the term limit movement can be seen from
the KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll. Term
limits were approved by a wide margin no
matter what ideology the respondents
claimed; nevertheless, ideology did seem
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to wield a degree of influence on the
tendency to say "yes" to term limits.
Conservatives were more likely to approve
of term limits than were liberals. Table 1
illustrates this tendency. A majority of
liberals as well as conservatives approved
of term limits, but this majority was
smaller for liberals (70 percent) than it
was for conservatives (86 percent). This
greater tendency for conservatives to
approve of term limits may be explained
by the conservative view that decreased
power in government is better. Liberals,
on the other hand, are generally more
permissive of increased power in
government.
On the national level, the greater
tendency for conservatives to sanction term
limits was also evident. In April 1992, the
Gallup Organization polled 1004 registered
voters randomly selected throughout the
United States. Not unlike the KBYU/Utah
Colleges Exit Poll results, term limits were
favored by a majority of both
conservatives and liberals. Furthermore,
conservatives (68 percent) were more
likely to favor term limits than liberals (58
Table 1. Term limit support among
conservatives and liberals.
% Conservatives

% Liberals

Yes

85.56

69.71

No

12.27

22.94

2.17

7.35

Don't
Know

Source: KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll, 1992.

percent) (Jimmerson 1993). Proponents
correctly assert that the term limit
movement is bipartisan, generally favored
by conservatives and liberals alike. On the
other hand, conservatives are indeed more
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likely to favor the movement more than
liberals.

The Arguments For and Against Tenn
Limits
Needless to say, the term limit
movement has not been able to avoid
controversy. The topic is a heated one,
with credible arguments on both sides of
the issue. The most prominent arguments
include the following:
The Paradox
Those who are against term limits
claim that the public doesn't really know
what it wants because in the last election,
while all 14 of the measures passed, 93
percent of the incumbents that made it to
the general election were reelected. This
paradoxical behavior shows that the public
is either hypocritical or has not made up
its mind. Term limit advocates, however,
assert that voting for term limits as well as
incumbents is not hypocritical; rather, such
behavior merely reinforces the term limit
argument, showing just how much of an
advantage incumbents actually have
(Petracca 1992).
.
But opponents counter by saying that
the term limit movement is an antiCongress hysteria driven by "unstoppable
populism," not by reason and common
sense (Woshinsky 1992). Although it is
true that many Americans are unhappy
with Congress, they should not channel
this discontent towards a drastic reform
about which most Americans know next to
nothing. However, term limit advocates
can argue that, unstoppable populism or
not, the electorate voted for term limits in
their respective states, and anyone who
upholds democratic values should respect
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the democratically passed term limit
measures.
The Incumbent Advantage
In the last general election, 93 percent
of the incumbents were reelected, political
action committees gave nine times as much
money to incumbents as they did to
challengers (Osgood 1992), and most
challengers were unable to compete with
their opponents in campaign expenditures.
Proponents of term limits often state facts
like these when using the incumbent
advantage as an argument for term limits.
They assert that limiting the terms of
incumbents will reinvigorate Congress with
new faces and new ideas, while those
against term limits claim that the good
incumbents will be thrown out with the
bad.
In elections, incumbents have a big
advantage over their challengers for the
following reasons. First, political action
committees and other contributors want to
put their money on the winner. Since the
incumbent has already shown that he or
she can win an election, most of the
contributions will be given to the
incumbent. A challenger's chances of
winning an election are somewhat greater
if he or she can outspend the incumbent,
but such an occurrence is rare (Erikson et
al. 1991, 320). Second, incumbents have
automatic name recognition due to
previous elections and media coverage.
The electorate is more likely to vote for a
name they recognize. Third, incumbents
have free mailing, or "franking" privileges
which enable them to campaign directly to
their constituents while the government
foots the bill. Finally, incumbents have
the advantage of a government-paid staff
that can keep them current on the issues in
case they engage in a debate. Each of the
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factors listed above contribute to the
uneven playing field on which incumbents
are favored.
As a result, proponents argue that since
incumbents are reasonably secure from
defeat on election day, there is less
incentive to meet the needs of the entire
district and more incentive to cater to the
special interest groups (both within and
without their constituencies) that fund their
reelection campaigns. After all, without
campaign contributions, the incumbent
advantage would significantly diminish.
Term limits, advocates claim, would put
an end to the incumbent advantage since
open seat elections would be more
frequent.
Opponents, on the other hand, assert
that term limits would eliminate the
incumbent advantage only once every
twelve years or whenever the terms expire.
This would cause serious, credible
challengers to wait a few years until the
seat becomes open, thus reinforcing the
incumbent advantage while the
incumbent's terms have not yet expired.
As a result, incumbents would ignore the
public and cater to special interests more
than ever. Opponents also argue that there
are less drastic, more practical options-such as campaign finance reform--that
would attack the incumbent advantage
more effectively.
Turnout
It has been statistically shown that
increased campaign spending does not
significantly lead to increased voter
participation. In The Money Chase,
Magleby and Nelson state that
"competition, however, does lead to higher
turnout, while expenditure imbalances
between candidates reduce it" (1990, 42).
Term limits will increase the frequency of
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open seats, and since political action
committees tend to give money to both
candidates in an open-seat election,
competition will increase, and therefore
voter turnout will improve. With this in
mind, term limit advocates claim that the
disproportional voice of lobbying groups
will be diminished by more voters coming
out to the polls. Opponents can argue that
there is no evidence to support that an
increase in turnout will mute lobbyists,
and even if this was the case, term limits
would only improve turnout once every six
to twelve years, depending on the term
limit.
Careerism
Term limit advocates decry "career"
politicians who look only towards
reelection and the interest groups that fund
their campaigns. Under the current
system, they say, members of Congress
feel successful if they are able to bring
home lots of money in the way of
entitlements, programs, and "pork."
Proponents call this behavior "careerism"
(Wi111992, 9), claiming that elected
officials will do just about anything to
keep their jobs as politicians. "To hell
with the deficit, to hell with America, I
have to get reelected next fall!" is what
some proponents might expect to hear
from an incumbent unrestrained by a term
limit.
Proponents claim that the soaring
deficit is a direct result of careerist attitude
among politicians. But the anti-term limit
argument is that the "I have to get
reelected next fall" attitude will only be
stopped after incumbents serve their terms,
which is every six to twelve years. They
also assert that term limits will not stop
careerism; politicians will simply hop from
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one elected position to another (Magleby
1993a).
Opponents use another word to
describe the system under term limits-"amateurism." If term limits are imposed,
Congress will lose its expert legislators
and be full of ignorant freshmen who will
make bad mistakes. Proponents counter
by saying that politicians are already
making bad mistakes, and besides,
amateurism is good--American politics was
never intended to be made up of career
politicians. As far as expertise is
concerned, term limit advocates claim that
representative government has failed if it
requires experts to be as skilled as
neurosurgeons. Furthermore, George Will
uses the executive branch as an example to
argue that a lifetime career is not required
in order to be affective in American
government:
If government is really such an arcane business,
how is it that the executive branch departments and
agencies are run, year in and year out, by Cabinet
and sub-Cabinet officers who come into government
for stints of eight or (usually) fewer years? (1992, 58)

Those against term limits claim that
term-limited politicians will fall prey to
corporate interest groups. Since members
of Congress will stay only for a few short
years, it is in their best interest to use their
temporary position as a spring board for
their post-political careers. Therefore,
especially during their last term, they will
try to cater to special corporate interests
that may provide employment in the
future. Proponents, on the other hand,
claim that the damage done every year by
the legislative careerist under the current
system is far worse than what term-limited
politicians mayor may not do during their
last term. Furthermore, George Will
reasons that special interest groups will not

Pi Sigma Alpha Review 50

even want to hire ex -congressmen whose
terms were limited:
Think about it. One reason ex-legislators are hired
by private interests today is to take advantage of their
relationships with ex-colleagues who remain in
Congress. But term limits will guarantee that those
relationships are short-lived. Those ex-colleagues
will soon be ex-congressmen. (1992, 212)

Accountability
Anti-term limit people argue that
during the incumbents' final terms in
office, they will have virtually no incentive
to legislate on behalf of their constituents,
since the only check against them,
reelection, is no longer existent. Oliver
Woshinsky claims that "the threat of
ejection keeps them honest," and term
limits will remove that threat. In fact, if
term limits were applied to all incumbents
right now, about one third of our public
officials would be serving their last terms,
which means that they would face no
electoral check on their behavior (1992).
Without this check, lawmakers would be
vulnerable to the influences of special
interest groups that encourage pork-barrel
politics and a massive deficit.
Proponents counter that career
politicians entrenched in their positions are
the ones who have fallen prey to the
interest groups. Always looking after the
needs of those who fund their reelection
campaigns, careerists fail to look at the
aggregate interests of the nation and
instead focus on the pork-barrel politics
that make their interest groups happy.
Constitutionality
Opponents declare that term limits will
not stand up before the Supreme Court.
Article I section 2 of the United States
Constitution states that there are only three
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qualifications for membership in Congress:
age, citizenship, and residency. Term
limits add a fourth qualification and are
therefore unconstitutional. This argument
was upheld in Powell v. McCormack. In
this case, Congress denied Adam Clayton
Powell a seat in the House because of
ethical misconduct. Asserting that age,
citizenship, and residency were the only
qualifications necessary for admittance into
Congress, the Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Powell. Opponents to term limits
claim that they violate the Constitution on
the same ground that Congress did in
Powell (1969, 486).
However, Article I section 4 dictates
that states have authority to set "times,
places, and manner of holding elections for
Senators and Representatives." Proponents
use this part of the Constitution to assert
that limiting terms falls under the states'
authority to set the "manner of holding
elections." Nonetheless, many advocates
for term limits concede on the
constitutionality issue. Their main goal,
therefore, is to make term limits
constitutional via the amendment process.
Since the Supreme Court does not usually
act until someone is directly affected, term
limits will probably not be challenged in
court until at least 1999, which is when
the first federal officials will reach their
limits. Proponents hope that by then term
limits will be passed in the form of an
amendment to the Constitution.
Increased Power of Staff, Bureaucrats, and
Lobbyists
Since staffers, bureaucrats, and
lobbyists are not elected, they can remain
a part of the legislative process for as long
as they can keep their jobs. Opponents to
term limits reason that these groups will be
more experienced and have "better
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command of the territory" than the termlimited Congressmen who are relatively
new on Capitol Hill (Will 1992, 56), and
lobbyists, staffers, and bureaucrats would
tend to interact with each other more than
with the elected officials Therefore,
limiting terms would put more power in
the hands of staffers, lobbyists, and
bureaucrats. Coyne rejects this argument,
stating that:
The reason that the 30-year veteran of the
bureaucracy has power is because he's been a buddy
for 30 years of an entrenched congressman and a
powerful lobbyist. The people have no power to
throw out the lobbyist or the power to fire the
bureaucrats, but we do have the power to keep the
congressmen from being entrenched. (Holmstrom
1992)

Even if this long-term relationship does
not exist, George Will adds that "the vast
majority of congressional staffers are not
career people." House staff serve for an
average of 5.0 years, and Senate staff
serve for an average of 5.7 years (1992,
57). These periods are less than any
proposed term limit, so how can staffers
gain more expertise than the Congressmen
who, on average, will be on Capitol Hill
longer than the staffers will?
Lobbyists, on the other hand, are
indeed professionals. Nevertheless, they
are opposed to term limits because they
flourish from the "long-term relationships
of mutual aggrandizement with career
legislators" (Will 1992, 57). Lobbyists
will have less influence since they will not
be as "buddy-buddy" with Congressmen.
And bureaucrats also dislike term limits,
since their power as well as their jobs
often depend on serving the long-term
needs of professional lawmakers (these
long-term needs are fulfilled when
perpetual government programs satisfy
campaign contributors) (Will 1992, 57).
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Causes v. Symptoms

Alternatives to Term Limits

Advocates promote the idea that term
limits will attract more enlightened,
"citizen" legislators who will not give in to
the temptations of campaign donations,
perks, and privileges. These term-limited
lawmakers, they claim, will come to
Washington to serve the public rather than
to accumulate campaign war chests that
will ensure a self-interested political
career. They also say that voter turnout
and participation will improve after term
limits have invigorated Congress and
increased election competition. In other
words, proponents are convinced that
limiting congressional terms will cure
much of the government's ills.
On the other hand, the opposition
asserts that term limits will not cure the
ills of American government--they will
merely go after the symptoms. Limiting
the number of terms a lawmaker can serve
will fail to deal directly with the problems
that motivated the term-limit movement in
the first place. Such problems include an
ever-expanding government, the
dominance of money in elections, public
apathy, and congressional perks and
privileges. Opponents to term limits argue
that each of these problems would persist
if term limits were imposed, and if they
were to have any effect at all, term limits
would only provide relief from these
problems periodically--once every six to
twelve years. In other words, term limits
would only attack the symptoms, not the
causes, of the problems that vex our
government; they would act as a
temporary bandage that would be applied
occasionally, only to be stripped off almost
as soon as it was put on. Opponents,
therefore, prescribe other alternatives to
limiting terms.

As just mentioned above, opponents to
the term limit movement suggest that other
reform measures can more effectively
remove the causes of the predicaments that
face lawmakers and the electorate. Below
several proposals are advocated, with an
emphasis in favor of campaign finance
reform.
Term Limits for Committee Chairs
Lawmakers greatly enhance their
incumbent advantage when they work their
way up through Congress's seniority
system and chair strategic committees.
Chairing a committee means more 'power,
which in tum increases campaign
contributions, which in tum makes it more
difficult for challengers to wage a
competitive campaign. As a result,
limiting the number of terms that a
member can serve as chairman has been
suggested by four House Democrats, led
by Oklahoma Representative David
McCurdy. They recommend that no
lawmaker should chair a committee for
more than eight years. McCurdy declares
that, "[s]ome committee chairmen are
more feared than the House leadership.
Our intent is to reduce the possible
arrogance that comes from having no
accountability" (Coyne and Fund 1992,
136).
Term limits are already imposed on
some chairs in Congress, and power
wielded by some chairmen who have limits
is somewhat greater than others who don't
(Coyne and Fund 1992, 137). Making
these limits for chairs universal would
probably decrease the entrenched power
that some chairman now monopolize.
Limiting the number of terms that all
members of Congress can serve, however,
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would also accomplish the task of breaking
a chairman's accumulation of undue
power, but only limiting the terms of
chairmanship would probably serve as a
less drastic means of breaking up this
power.
Franking
Under the current system, federal
lawmakers are given free mailing
privileges, paid for by the government.
During a campaign, incumbents can use
this franking advantage to get ahead of
their challengers who have to finance their
mailing with private funds. Under term
limit reform, franking would still exist-incumbents whose terms of office have not
expired would remain free to use this
advantage over their challengers. Open
seat elections, which would probably come
up once every six to twelve years, would
be the only elections where the role of
franking would be nonexistent.
Besides term limits, there are two ways
to attack this unfair incumbent advantage.
Incumbents' free mailing privileges could
be eliminated, or the same privileges could
be granted to challengers for the
campaign's duration. A comprehensive
implementation of the former proposal is
neither likely nor feasible; representatives
and senators also use their franking
privilege for non-campaign matters.
Nevertheless, some states, such as
Connecticut, impose a cutoff date for
franking as the election campaign for state
officials gets underway (Van Hom 1993,
128). The latter proposal could also
contribute to a possible cure--subsidizing
mailing activities of the challengers as well
as the incumbents. Elected officials would
probably prefer this reform over a cutoff
date; few would want to give up their
mailing privilege, even if the withdrawal
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was only temporary. If implemented,
however, one of these two reforms could
begin to put contenders on a level playing
field.
Staff
Along with franking, an incumbent
also enjoys a staff as well as a local office
paid for by the federal government. An
incumbent's staff members can help with
the election campaign by keeping their
boss updated on the issues and by
mobilizing campaign contributors and
volunteers. On the other hand, challengers
are forced to use their campaign funds for
the same services. Once again, term
limits would solve this imbalance only
periodically--once every six to twelve
years.
An alternative to term limits, therefore,
would include providing temporary staffs
and office space for challengers,
compliments of the federal government.
Although this would mean dipping into the
national treasury, incumbents would no
longer be alone in their ability to use a
well-staffed office at the government's
expense.
Money and Elections
Since the 1970's, campaign
expenditures have skyrocketed. In
constant 1990 dollars, aggregate
congressional campaign spending rose
from $196 million in 1974 to $405 million
in 1984 to $445 million in 1990 (Magleby
and Nelson 1990, 29), sustaining an
average yearly growth of $15.6 million.
Even more recently, the aggregate total of
$380 million spent by 1992's general
election candidates up to 20 days prior to
the election set a new record in the history
of America's campaign spending (FEC
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1992, 1). As a result, competitive
challengers must raise huge amounts of
money, and elected officials must spend a
large portion of their time raising
campaign funds rather than doing what
they were elected to do--make public
policy.
Along with increased campaign
expenditures and expanding fund raising
cycles, there has been a significant
proliferation of political action committees
(PACs). In 1974 there were 608 PACs,
and by the end of 1990 the number of
PACs had risen to 4,172 (Stanley and
Niemi 1992, 175). This climb in the
number of PACs has increased the amount
of money available to candidates because
unlike individual contributors, PACs are
not limited in the total amount of money
they can contribute during and election.
Additionally, individuals can only give
$1,000 per candidate while PACs can give
$5,000 per candidate. These two factors,
no total contribution limit and a relatively
high per-candidate contribution limit, have
added to the growth in the number of
PACs as well as the political influence of
the special interest groups that sustain
those PACs.
Furthermore, campaign contributions
are far from being divided equally among
candidates. As mentioned earlier, the
incumbent advantage is significant; in the
1992 election, political action committees
gave nine times as much money to
incumbents as they did to challengers
(Osgood 1992), and as a result, 93 percent
of the incumbents that made it to the
general election were reelected. This
reelection rate for incumbents is not
uncommon and reflects the laclc of
competition between officials seeking
another term of office and their
challengers. In regard to the 1992
elections, Fred Wortheimer, the president
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of Common Cause, said, "In a year when
'change' was the by-word of our national
elections, congressional incumbents were
once again protected in their races by a
wall of money" (Osgood 1992).
Money has definitely evolved into a
dominant election factor. Mentioned
above are three of the ways money has
manifested its influence on elections--Iong
fund raising cycles, disproportionate
influence of special interests, and lack of
competition between incumbents and
challengers. Will term limitations solve
these problems? Probably not. At most,
they will briefly alleviate the problems
once every six to twelve years. There are,
however, other reform proposals that may
prove to be successful in increasing
competition, decreasing dependence on
interest group money, and decreasing time
spent on fund raising.
One of the most debated reform
proposals is public finance of
congressional elections. Although the
federal government funds presidential
campaigns, no such funding exists for
congressional candidates. If administered
carefully, however, there is a high
probability that federal funding of
congressional elections would achieve the
goals of increasing candidate competition,
minimizing the role of interest groups, and
shortening fund raising cycles.
Public funding will make congressional
races more competitive because
challengers, who otherwise have a difficult
time raising money, will receive enough
public funds to wage an advertisement
campaign that will give them substantial
visibility. It is important to point out here
that public funding will not put incumbents
and challengers on level ground;
challengers need more money to be as well
known as their opponents. Nevertheless,
public financing would enable challengers
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to enjoy more name recognition than they
now have--under current campaign finance
laws, most challengers are unknown to
most constituents. Since much of the
campaign battle is public name
recognition, federal funds will help
challengers be more, although not equally,
competitive.
If public funds are to help campaigns
become more competitive, there is a
condition that the candidates must accept:
spending limits. Although the Supreme
Court has ruled that spending limits are
unconstitutional, voluntary spending limits
are not (Buckley v. Valeo 1976, 1). In
other words, if a candidate voluntarily
agrees to limit campaign spending by
accepting public funds in return, then the
spending limit is constitutional. Therefore,
public funds for congressional elections
need to be given on the condition that the
recipients limit their spending. Otherwise,
one of the candidates could significantly
outspend the other despite the presence of
public funds.
Public funding will also diminish the
role of special interest groups and their
PAC money. Since publicly financed
candidates will receive a substantial
amount of government money; they will
rely less on PAC contributions. This will
reduce the undue influence of special
interest groups.
Finally, candidates will have more time
available to engage in policy making
activities rather than fund raising activities.
Knowing that they will receive a large
portion of their campaign funds from the
government, incumbents as well as
challengers will not be preoccupied with
filling their calendars full of fund raising
events (Magleby 1993b).
Although public financing of
congressional elections will cost the
nation's taxpayers more money than term
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limits would, these taxpayers may be
pleased in the end. Politicians will be less
inclined to grant expensive favors to the
interest groups that used to fund their
elections; having greater competition from
their challengers, incumbents will work
harder to represent their constituents'
interests; and elected officials will have
more time to study the issues and therefore
become better policy makers. All of this
can be accomplished without limiting the
terms of lawmakers.
Besides public funding, there are other
proposals for campaign finance reform that
may prove to be more effective than term
limits. For example, it has been proposed
that individual contribution limits be
increased while PAC contributions be
decreased. This will supposedly diminish
the role of PACs and increase the role of
individual constituents. However, as long
as there is no limit on spending, fund
raising cycles will continue to lengthen and
competition will continue to be nominal.
Public funding, on the other hand, will
cause candidates to limit their spending,
and the public will enjoy the
accompanying benefits.
Conclusion
The conservative-influenced term limit
movement has gained a great deal of
popularity at a time when many Americans
are fed up with the way things are running
in Washington, D.C. In my opinion, term
limits would be a treatment rather than a
cure for the ills of Congress. As long as
the United States government retains its
powers to regulate, subsidize, spend, and
whatever else it wants to do, an unlimited
number of interest groups will make an
infinite number of request on elected
officials. These officials, in tum, will
look to these interest groups for help
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getting reelected. Term limits will hinder
this detrimental relationship only once
every six years (at the most). Therefore,
under term limit reform, the problems of a
troubled government will not go away,
they will only be slightly muted.
Alternatives to term limits, such as
term limits for chair positions, either
mutual or suspended franking privileges,
subsidized staffs for challengers, and

public funding of campaigns would attack
the causes of our government's illness
more directly. Nevertheless, whether term
limits will save America from itself
remains to be seen. In the meantime,
Americans will try to work out the
meaning as well as the constitutionality of
the nationwide plea, "Stop me before I
vote again!"
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Education and the Gender Gap in Earned Income

by Alison Wiltbank Brady
The literature on gender differences puts forth at least three potential explanations for gender
differences in income: the human capital theory, the direct discrimination theory, and the
socialization theory. Using regression analysis and aggregate U.S. figures for education and
earnings yields support for the direct discrimination theory. However, the resultant model
predicts a decrease in earnings for both males and females who attend some college but do
not graduate. The model, therefore, indicates that discrimination does exist in the workforce
and calls for further research to explain the unexpected decrease in earnings for nongraduating college attenders.

Evidence from the literature supports
the notion that there is a gender gap in
income. I wanted to know whether this
differential is due to the human capital
theory--that men simply have more of the
skills which are needed in the work world,
including education--or the direct
discrimination theory--the jobs which
women tend to choose pay less simply
because women choose them. Because of
this, I decided to study the effect of
education on income for women. I will
study the effects of education on workers
as a whole, and separately for men and
women, then compare the economic
benefits of education for each gender.
Literature Review

Many researchers in the various fields
of economics, sociology, psychology and
political science have studied the issue of
the gender gap for income. Most of these
studies include some discussion of
education, some of which are relevant to
this study. Although my study examines
only the human capital and direct
discrimination theories, I will include
discussions of articles involving the
socialization theory--that women are
socialized to choose certain types of jobs

which pay less--to give readers a more
thorough review of the academic literature.
In a study of nine industrial nations,
Donald Treiman and Patricia Roos
examined the theory that the earnings
differential is due to less human capital
accumulated by women, including
education. In six of the nine countries,
including the United States, the return to
education was less for women than for
men, and in five of the countries the
educational coefficient is not statistically
different from zero. For five countries
there was no evidence against the
hypothesis that women receive no increase
in income based on more education.
Because the United States falls in the
category of countries where the coefficient
of women's education as an independent
variable for predicting earnings is not
significantly different from zero, this study
would support my hypothesis that women
receive less income benefit from education
than men (1983).
Examining the productivity aspect of
human capital, Robinson and Wunnava use
a frontier approach to study the earningsproductivity differential which eliminates
the need to assume that all unmeasured
male and female characteristics are the
same. Because of this elimination of bias,
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their study is more sound than most
studies of its kind, and their results should
be considered credible. These results
show that female earnings would be 25
percent higher per hour without direct
discrimination (1989). This seems to
indicate that human capital theories based
on the type of education men and women
receive do not account for much of the
female earnings differential. Because this
study was not dealing with careers
involving high amounts of education,
however, it may not be directly applicable
to my interest in women's returns to
higher education.
Robin Bartlett and Timothy Miller
studied the educational aspect of human
capital by gender, through executive
earnings of Denison and Wellesley college
graduates. Their research indicated that
men made 50.7 percent more than women,
despite more graduate study on the part of
the women, and more prestigious study for
the Wellesley graduates. When the
authors substituted the sample
characteristics of Denison men into the
estimated regression equation as Denison
women, it showed that Denison men would
make $27,225 less if evaluated by the
same criteria as the women; this implies
that about half of the earnings differential
between the men and women could not be
explained by sample characteristics (1988).
This indicates that even controlling for
education, discrimination against women
still exists.
U sing the socialization theory, HansPeter Blossfield studied sexual segregation
of careers in the Federal Republic of
Germany. His research indicates that
although there has been an equalization of
men and women in educational
opportunities, they are still segregated for
vocational training, which limits training
opportunities for women (1987). It is
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possible that different areas of study may
influence the benefits of education in the
United States, as well. Socialization of
men and women toward stereotypical
majors may lead men to careers that pay
more.
The idea that socialization of men and
women towards different fields contributes
to the income differential is supported by a
study by Barry Gerhart, in which he
examined gender differences in current and
starting salaries controlling for college
major. He found that 43 percent of the
starting salary differences between males
and females were due to college major.
He also found that men receive higher
returns to their degree level among college
graduates (this is not true for the whole
sample, which included non-college
graduates) (1990, 424). Thus the reason
women make less could be due to the fact
that they choose less rewarding fields.
On the other hand, another theory
about gender income differentials involves
the reverse idea that because women are
the common employees in a field, products
from jobs in which women are the
common employees ("women's work") are
undervalued; in other words, women do
not choose low paying jobs, jobs that
women choose become low paying.
Donald Williams and Charles Register
studied this possibility versus the
possibility that the products are simply of
low value by examining the proportion of
employees that are male compared to the
earning in the occupation at that point in
time. They examined variations within
occupations and across regions. Their
study supported the undervalued hypothesis
in four of eight occupations; the others
were statistically insignificant (1986).
This indicates that the earnings differential
is at least partially due to direct
discrimination against women. It also
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might indicate that women would actually
receive higher returns to education if they
avoided "female" occupations. In this
way, the practical conclusion of the direct
discrimination theory is the same as the
socialization theory.
In order to examine direct
discrimination, Francine Blau and Andrea
Beller studied the trends in earning
differentials by gender from 1971-1981.
Their study shows that the disparity
between female and male earnings had
decreased over that decade, a positive
trend for women. The results suggest that
this is due to declining gender
specialization and discrimination.
However, they also discovered that returns
of education for women actually decreased
over that decade, as did employment in
"male" and integrated jobs. This
correlation between women in "male" jobs
and earnings could support either the
direct discrimination or socialization
theory. Thus women with higher degrees
were not only receiving less than men with
similar degrees in 1981, they were also
experiencing fewer gains in the income
differential than they had ten years
previous (1987).
Given the existing research; there are
educational returns for both genders.
However, these articles support the notion
that women receive less income increase
per year of education, perhaps making
women think twice about graduate study.
There is evidence that this is based partly,
but not solely, on college major. Although
my study will not examine college major,
that should be considered in evaluating the
costs and benefits of education. It also
seems that this may be due at l~st
partially to "women's work" being
undervalued. I will consider these theories
and their supporting evidence as I evaluate
my own results; they will help me explain
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the differences that show up in my data,
and tum statistics into something
understandable and logically supported.

Method
To analyze the effect of education on
income benefits for women, I used
variables for gender and education, only.
Although I first planned to use job
category variables, due to the aggregate
nature of my data, these variables were
collinear with education; therefore, they
were unnecessary. As well, the
regressions were powerful models without
job category, according to the R squared
values, which indicate the percent of
variance of income explained by each
model (See Table 1). The sample consists
of the United States black and white fulltime work force over the age of twentyfive, from 1979 to 1987.
The dependent variable, income,
consists of average weekly income for fulltime United States workers.
The gender variable is a simple dummy
(zer%ne) variable, men being assigned
the number one, and women, zero. The
education variables included in the final
regression are the percentage of people
who have attended some college and the
percentage of people who have attended
four years or more of college. The base
case in the regression consists of those
who received a high school education or
less. Data was used from Statistical
Abstracts of the United States and Labor
Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, both published by the
United States government.
Also included in the model was a
variable called year, which is basically an
inflation variable to control for income
data in non-adjusted dollars. The data are
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recorded from year one to nine, starting in
1979 and running through 1987.
Table 1 shows the results of a
regression for the whole population on
earnings, accounting for gender and
examining returns to education. Table 2 is
a regression on the data for women only,
examining income as affected by
education. Table 3 shows a regression of
income for men, by education. For
statistical tables see the Appendix.
Results
The model was very powerful, with an
adjusted R squared of 98 percent for the
overall earnings regression, meaning that
98 percent of the variance in income was
explained by the variance in gender,
education and year that were included in
the model (Table 1). The regressions for
each gender, specifically, received slightly
higher R-squared values of 99 percent for
both the male and female education/
earnings regression. Collinearity for the
complete model was well within normal
limits; what did exist was mainly between
the year and partial college variables.
As expected, earnings for those with a
college degree were significantly higher
than earnings for those with a high school
diploma or less. Overall, college
graduates make $665.84 more per week
than those with a high school education or
less.
The returns for a college degree were
higher for men than women; the results
indicate that men receive 69 percent more
for getting a college degree than women.
Women with a college degree make
$429.32 more than women without any
years of college. Their male counterparts,
on the other hand, make $724.30 more per
week than men without any college. This
education dividend is so much larger for
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men than women even though men without
any college seem to make more than
women without college.
Very surprising were the results for the
variable indicating some, but not complete,
college education. The total population
regression indicated that those with some
college make $767.17 less per week than
those with no college. Both gender
specific regressions showed less weekly
earnings after having some college
education than with a high school
education or less. And male losses with
some college were more than five times
higher, at $1482.10, than female losses, at
$286.22. That difference may have
something to do with the fact that women
have a shorter distance to the bottom.
Even without thinking about theoretical
grounding, the numbers seem outrageously
high--if men with some college make
$1482.10 less per week than men with
only high school educations, they must be
making negative money.
Theoretically, I see no reason for the
results indicating that people who attend
some college actually make less than those
with no college. The population is made
up of full-time workers, so current
students who may accept low paying jobs
would generally not be included in the
data. Although there is some collinearity
between year and some college, it is
within reasonable limits and should not
cause problems. These results are
contrary to other studies where income
rises steadily with increased years of
schooling, as well.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to
examine educational returns to women in
the context of overall returns and returns
to men. The data show unusual and
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unexplainable results in that those with
some college education, but no degree,
make significantly less than those with no
college education. However, the data do
provide evidence that women receive
higher incomes for college degrees than
they would without them, but fewer
income benefits for a college education
than men. This detracts from the human
capital theory and supports the direct
discrimination theory.
The results of the study are significant
for women thinking of pursuing graduate
studies, in terms of how much they are

willing to spend for such schooling. More
generally, given the degree to which
economic equality secures political
equality, the government should take a
role, as it has historically, in ensuring that
people are treated j ustl y in the
marketplace. My results, showing that
wage discrimination exists after controlling
for education, may contribute to the
academic literature suggesting that women
are not being treated justly, and therefore,
may be entitled to some governmental laws
or programs on their behalf.
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APPENDIX--Statistical Tables

Table 1
Unweighted Least Squares Linear Regression of Earnings
Variable

DF

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

T for Ho:
Prob> ITI
Parameter =0

Intercept
Year2
Gender
Per13
Per16

1
1
1

194.096394
16.458521
90.345749
-767.169601
665.840846

32.24526995
1.31843508
3.99843539
195.4427299
32.63243555

6.019
12.483
22.595
-3.925
20.404

1
1

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0004
0.0001

Collinearity Diagnostics (intercept adjusted)
No.

Eigenvalue

Condition
Number

Var Prop
Year2

Var Prop
Gender

Var Prop
Per 13

Var Prop
Per16

1
2
3
4

1.91112
1.16596
0.76378
0.15914

1.00000
1.28027
1.58183
3.46540

0.0178
0.0004
0.0222
0.9055

0.0046
0.4423
0.4202
0.1329

0.0702
0.0080
0.0095
0.9123

0.0368
0.2913
0.6559
0.0160

Model: MODELl
Dependent Variable: EARNINGS
Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

F Value

Model
Error
C Total

4
31
35

221107.60853
3865.39147
224973.00000

55276.90213
124.69005

443.314

Root MSE
Dep Mean

11.16647
306.16667

R-square
Adj R-sq

0.9828
0.9806
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Table 2
Unweighted Least Squares Linear Regression of Earnings--Women
Predictor
Variables

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Student's T

Constant
Year
Some college
College grad

156.81
14.362
-286.22
429.52

16.196
0.75783
94.323
26.319

9.68
18.95
-3.03
16.32

0.9943
R Squared
Adjusted R Squared 0.9931
Source
DF
Model
3
Residual 14
Total
17
Cases Included 18

P

0.0000
0.0000
0.0089
0.0000

Resid. Mean Square (MSE) 12.66
Standard Deviation
3.557

F
817.54

SS

MS
3.1038 x lat 1.0346 x lat
177.17
12.655
3.1216 x lat

P
0.0000

Table 3
Unweighted Least Squares Linear Regression of Earnings--Men
Predictor
Variables

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Student's T

Constant
Year
Some College
College Grad.

386.70
19.560
-1482.1
724.30

33.393
1.1663
207.93
25.217

11.58
16.77
-7.13
28.72

R Squared
0.9903
Adjusted R Squared 0.9882
Source
DF
Model
3
Residual 14
Total
17
Cases Included 18

P

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Resid. Mean Square (MSE) 62.01
7.874
Standard Deviation

SS
MS
8.8345 x lat 2.9448 x lat
868.08
62.005
8.9213 x lat

F
474.93

P
0.0000

